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ABSTRACT
The purpose of my dissertation is to investigate how employees react to their supervisors’
decisions not to use ex-post discretionary adjustments to mitigate the effects that negative
unexpected events have on their bonuses. To address this objective, I pose the following research
question: Will the level of interdependence inherent within the compensation of multiple
employees (i.e., compensation interdependence) and the likelihood the event will reoccur (i.e.,
future event likelihood) affect employees’ reactions (future effort and workplace deviance) when
they don’t receive ex-post discretionary adjustments to mitigate the effects of negative events?
I address my research question using an experiment where I vary the level of
compensation interdependence (absent vs. present) and future event likelihood (low vs. high)
while observing how employees react to not receiving an ex-post discretionary adjustment. I find
that employees decrease their future effort and increase their workplace deviance behavior more
when compensation interdependence is absent than when it is present but only when future event
likelihood is low and not when it is high. I also find that employees’ distributive justice
evaluations are lower and adjustment expectations are higher when compensation
interdependence is absent than when it is present but once again only when future event
likelihood is low and not when it is high.
My dissertation contributes to existing literature. First, while existing research examines
how supervisors make ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions based on external factors and
management control features, my study examine employees’ reactions to these decisions.
Second, my dissertation contributes to existing research that examines how supervisors’ use of
ex-post discretionary adjustments affect employees’ justice evaluations and future effort. I find
that employees evaluate multiple factors simultaneously when reacting to these decisions.
i
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Many organizations experience unexpected events that are uncontrollable by their
employees, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. To control for the inaccuracies (i.e., “noise”) that
these events create on employees’ measured performance, many employers provide supervisors
with the ability to make adjustments (i.e., ex-post discretionary adjustments) to employees’
objective performance measures (i.e., revenue, sales, profits, etc.) to mitigate the effects of these
uncontrollable events. Ex-post discretionary adjustments may benefit both employees and
employers by reducing compensation risk, decreasing perceived unfairness, and increasing the
effectiveness of incentives (Holmstrom 1979; Banker and Datar 1989; Bol 2008). However, prior
studies find that supervisors often abstain from making ex-post discretionary adjustments and,
even when they decide to make these adjustments, they do not fully exercise their discretion (Bol
2008; Hoppe and Moers 2011; Bol, Hecht and Smith 2015). In particular, Bol et al. (2015) find
that the future likelihood of an uncontrollable event (i.e., future event likelihood) and the level of
interdependence inherent within the compensation of multiple employees(i.e., compensation
interdependence) affect supervisors’ propensity to make ex-post discretionary adjustments.
Building on Bol et al.’s (2015) findings, my dissertation investigates the employees’ perspective
and studies employees’ reactions to not receiving ex-post discretionary adjustments under
different levels of future event likelihood and compensation interdependence. Specifically, I pose
the following research question: when their supervisors decide not to make ex-post discretionary
adjustments, will future event likelihood and compensation interdependence affect employees’
perceptions of distributive justice1, adjustment expectations, and subsequent work behaviors?
Consistent with Vermunt, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg and Blaauw (2001), the term “outcome fairness”
and “distributive justice” are used interchangeably in the thesis. To disentangle the effects of procedural justice and
distribute justice from each other, I select to keep procedural justice levels constant and relatively high by always
having ex-post discretionary adjustments available within the compensation contract. Both Kelly et al. (2015) and
1

1

In particular, I examine whether employees perceive and react to not receiving ex-post
discretionary adjustments differently depending on compensation interdependence (i.e., whether
the ex-post discretionary adjustment is from an individual bonus pool and has no effects on other
employees or it is from a shared bonus pool and has negative effects on other employees). I
examine the effects of compensation interdependence in two settings: when future event
likelihood is high (i.e., the event is almost certain to reoccur) and when future likelihood is low
(i.e., the event is almost certain not to reoccur). Notably, in my study, I examine situations in
which ex-post discretionary adjustments are allowed but not used by supervisors. This is
different from a majority of other accounting studies that examine situations in which ex-post
adjustments are either allowed in the organization or not allowed (Gibbs, Merchant, Van der
Stede, and Vagus 2004; Arnold and Artz 2015; Kelly, Webb, and Vance 2015; Burt, Libby and
Presslee 2019; Wong 2019).
First, I hypothesize that employees’ distributive justice evaluations will be more negative
when compensation interdependence is absent versus present because ex-post discretionary
adjustments have no adverse effects on their co-workers. I predict that the effect of compensation
interdependence is only evident when future event likelihood is low and not when it is high. I
draw on fairness heuristic theory (Van den Bos 2001; Lind 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, and Wilke,
2001) to predict why employees’ reactions will vary depending on future event likelihood.
According to fairness heuristic theory, employees utilize primary information (i.e., the
availability of ex-post adjustments) to develop their fairness heuristic, which they then use to
evaluate all elements of justice. They use this heuristic as a shortcut for all subsequent justice

Wong (2019) find that the availability of ex-post discretionary adjustments increases employees’ procedural justice
evaluations.

2

evaluations until a distinct or dramatic event occurs (Van den Bos and Lind 2009). In my setting,
uncontrollable events with a low future event likelihood are more distinct than events with a high
future event likelihood. Therefore, future event likelihood will influence whether employees rely
on their preestablished fairness heuristic to evaluate distributive justice or are compelled to reevaluate distributive justice based on newly available information like not receiving ex-post
discretionary adjustments.
Further, I hypothesize that employees will have higher adjustment expectations when
compensation interdependence is absent versus present, but this effect again will only occur
when future event likelihood is low and not when it is high. I utilize psychological contract
theory (Rousseau 1989; Morrison and Robinson 1997) and attribution theory (Kelley 1967;
1971;1972; 1973) to hypothesize how employees’ adjustment expectations will be affected by
compensation interdependence. When future event likelihood is low, I hypothesize that
employees will have higher adjustment expectations when compensation interdependence is
absent (vs. present) because they are more likely to make external attributions about the
unforeseeable event which is distinct and low in consistency. When making external attributions,
employees may engage in social comparison and will have higher adjustment expectations when
compensation interdependence is absent (vs. present). In contrast, when future event likelihood is
high, I predict that compensation interdependence will not affect employees’ adjustment
expectations because employees will make internal attributions about the unexpected event and
thus, will be less likely to consider external information including the compensation
interdependence inherent in their bonuses. This will make the level of compensation
interdependence unimportant when future event likelihood is high.

3

Lastly, since employees’ perceptions (distributive justice evaluations and adjustment
expectations) will affect their future behaviors, I predict that employees’ future effort will be
lower and workplace deviance will be higher when compensation interdependence is absent (vs.
present). Employees will likely decrease their effort and increase their workplace deviance
(revenge seeking behavior) in response to the perceived inequity and psychological contract
breach of not receiving the ex-post discretionary adjustment. Again, I hypothesize that the effects
of compensation interdependence on work behaviors will only occur when future event
likelihood is low (vs. high).
I conduct a case-based experiment that manipulates between-participants, future event
likelihood (high vs. low) and compensation interdependence (absent vs. present). I recruit 182
working employees as participants from Prolific, an online recruitment platform. Participants
assume the role of an employee who experienced an unforeseeable event that has a negative
impact on their bonus. Across conditions, the participants learn that their supervisors decided not
to make a positive ex-post discretionary adjustment to their bonus to neutralize the effects of this
event. Their main task is to react to this event and the news that their supervisors did not provide
them with a discretionary adjustment. Future event likelihood is manipulated by describing the
likelihood that the event is expected to reoccur in the future (i.e., almost certain to reoccur vs.
almost certain not to reoccur). Compensation interdependence is manipulated by outlining
whether employees’ bonus comes from an individual pool from which a positive ex-post
discretionary adjustment will not impact the bonuses of other employees or from a shared pool
from which a positive ex-post discretionary adjustment on the focal employee will result in a
negative discretionary adjustment for another employee. The main dependent variables are
distributive justice evaluations, adjustment expectations, future effort, and workplace deviance.
4

Results from my experiment support my expectations. First, I find that employees’
distributive justice evaluations are more negative when compensation interdependence is absent
(vs. present) and future event likelihood is low. Unexpectedly, when future event likelihood is
high, I find that employees’ distributive justice evaluations are marginally lower when
compensation interdependence is present (vs. absent). Second, I find that employees’ adjustment
expectations and workplace deviance are higher when compensation interdependence is absent
(vs. present) but only when future event likelihood is low but not when it is high. Similarly, I
find that employees’ future effort is lower when compensation interdependence is absent (vs.
present) but only when future event likelihood is low but not when it is high. Taken together, my
results suggest that employees take into consideration external factors like future event
likelihood and compensation interdependence when reacting to their supervisors’ ex-post
discretionary adjustment decisions.
I perform a supplemental study that examines the same research questions but, in a
setting where the discretionary adjustment impacts employees’ raises2 (or salary increases based
on their annual performance) instead of their bonuses. Overall, the findings are different from
those from the main study, suggesting that employees evaluate ex-post discretionary adjustment
decisions differently based on the type of compensation that they affect (raise versus bonus). One
potential reason for these differences is that raises increase employees’ base pay and their
subsequent payments from regular payroll whereas bonuses only increase employees’ income
one-time and can be perceived as a windfall. As a result, when considering ex-post discretionary
adjustments, employees may be more cognizant of justice information when event likelihood is

2

The raises researched in the supplemental study refer to salary increases employees receive based on their annual
performance evaluations and not because of a promotion. Although promotions usually entail a raise, promotion
decisions are usually based on multiple factors including but not limited to an employees’ past performance in their
current job and are thus outside of the scope of my study.
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high and compensation interdependence is present because uncontrollable events will make the
employees perpetually worse of than their co-workers. Therefore, ex-post discretionary
adjustments for raises have a longer-term impact on employees’ wealth than bonuses do.
My dissertation has important implications for research. First, it builds on Bol et al.
(2015) that identify the joint effects of future event likelihood and compensation interdependence
on supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions. My study augments Bol et al.’s
(2015) findings by examining the effects of these contextual factors from the employees’
perspective. Second, my dissertation examines subjectivity from the employees’ perspective and
its influence on employee performance and work behaviors. Specifically, I examine how not
exercising ex-post discretionary adjustments when they are available to supervisors can influence
employees’ distributive justice evaluations, adjustment expectations, future effort, and workplace
deviance behavior. A majority of accounting studies that examine employees’ reactions to expost discretionary adjustments examine a setting in which ex-post discretionary adjustments are
either allowed or not allowed (Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vagus 2004; Arnold and
Artz 2015; Kelly, Webb, and Vance 2015; Burt, Libby and Presslee 2019; Wong 2019). My
research differs from these studies because it focuses on a setting where ex-post discretionary
adjustments are permitted by the compensation contract but are not utilized. This is an important
setting to study as Hoppe and Moers (2011) find that a majority of organizations that include expost discretionary adjustments in their compensation contracts do not use them. However, their
availability may have an impact on employees’ fairness perceptions and the level of contracting
risk they experience so it is important to ascertain how employees react to different events when
ex-post discretionary adjustments are available but not used.

6

My research also benefits practitioners, especially managers who are responsible for
making ex-post discretionary adjustments decisions and the designers of compensation contacts.
Prior studies find that in practice, few supervisors make ex-post discretionary adjustments. This
is evidenced by Höppe and Moers (2011) findings that only 24% of organizations that publicly
disclosed the availability of ex-post discretionary adjustments in their compensation contracts
actually use them. My findings highlight that the mere availability (without the use) of ex-post
discretionary adjustments may have behavioral consequences on employees’ future effort and
workplace deviance behavior. As a result, supervisors need to factor in these behavioral
consequences when making ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions to ensure that their
decisions are not costly for their organizations. Second, my study shows that if supervisors’
decisions do not align with employees’ adjustment expectations, the availability of ex-post
adjustments may actually counteract the benefits of subjectivity by increasing employees’ levels
of perceived unfairness and decreasing the effectiveness of incentives. As a result, supervisors
need to be cognizant of their employees’ expectations about receiving ex-post discretionary
adjustments. My findings also benefit the designers of compensation contracts by illustrating that
there are real costs of including ex-post discretionary adjustments into the contract. Designers of
compensation contracts need to explore effective ways to mitigate these costs to fully benefit
from all the advantages that ex-post discretionary adjustments introduce into the compensation
contract (Bol 2008; Bol et al. 2015).
The remainder of my thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, I review accounting
and psychology literatures on subjectivity in general and on ex-post discretionary adjustments,
specifically. I also review applicable literature on fairness heuristic theory and its relation to
distributive justice. Lastly, I discuss psychological contract theory and how both fairness
7

heuristic theory and psychological contract theory relate to my setting. Using the theories that I
review in Chapter 2, I develop four hypotheses for my research in Chapter 3. My hypotheses
predict the effects of compensation interdependence on employees’ distributive justice
evaluations, adjustment expectations, future effort, and workplace deviance behavior in two
settings: when future event likelihood is high and when future event likelihood is low. I describe
the method used in my experiment in Chapter 4. In particular, I discuss my case details,
experimental design, independent variables and dependent variables. Chapter 5 reports the
results from my main experiment and supplemental study. In Chapter 5, I discuss the
randomization tests I used, report formal tests for my hypotheses, describe the design and results
of the supplemental study, and present robustness checks. Lastly, Chapter 6 concludes my thesis.
It highlights the contributions that my dissertation makes to accounting literature on performance
evaluations, the implications that my research has on practice, and the limitations and future
opportunities that my study presents.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I review the accounting, psychology and organizational behavior
literature on subjective ex-post discretionary adjustments and discuss prior research based on
which I later develop predictions regarding how distributive justice and adjustment expectations
influence employees’ future effort and workplace deviance behavior when ex-post discretionary
adjustments are not made. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I
review the literature examining subjectivity in compensation contracts. Next, I provide an
overview of distributive justice literature through the lens of fairness heuristics theory in Section
2.3. In Section 2.4, I review research on how employees form expectations about their workplace
via psychological contracts and the effects that psychological contract breaches have on
employees. I conclude this chapter in Section 2.5.
2.2 Subjectivity in Compensation Contracting
I begin this section by defining subjectivity and examining the various methods of
subjectivity utilized by employers. Next, I discuss the relevance and importance of subjectivity
in compensation contracts. Lastly, I review the existing research on the specific type of
subjectivity that I examine in my study, i.e., ex-post discretionary adjustments.
2.2.1 An Overview of Subjectivity in Employment Contracts
Subjectivity “entails judgment based on personal impressions, feelings, and opinions,
rather than on external facts.” (Bol 2008, p. 2). Bol (2008) further emphasizes that subjectivity is
introspective and not verifiable by third parties. As a result, it is almost impossible to evaluate
the correctness of subjective assessments because they are based on the judgements of the
evaluator (i.e., supervisor) rather than facts (Bol 2008). It is advantageous to incorporate
9

subjectivity into almost every type of compensation contract. Subjectivity is beneficial to
compensation contracts in which employees perform subjective tasks that are not easily
quantifiable or verifiable because it provides measures, although subjective, for employers to
evaluate their employees with. Subjectivity is also beneficial to compensation contracts where
employees perform objective tasks, that are quantifiable and verifiable, as it provides employers
with the flexibility to alter the weight of specific performance measures, or the amount of
compensation provided based on information that is not available ex-ante (Bol 2008).
Subjectivity can be incorporated into compensation contracts through the design of the
overall management control system and its various features. For example, subjectivity can be
integrated into 1) the initial design of the compensation contract (Kuang and Moser 2009), 2) the
formulation of performance goals (Anderson, Dekker and Sedatole 2010), or 3) the selection and
weighting of performance evaluation criteria (Ittner, Larker and Meyer 2003). The use of
subjectivity in these management control features is not mutually exclusive and employers can
use any combination of these subjective features within a single compensation contract. The
incorporation of subjectivity into these management control features provides employers with the
flexibility to integrate some level of discretion or judgement for future use.
According to Bol (2008), the most prevalent way that subjectivity is integrated into
compensation contracts is through the performance evaluation process. For performance
evaluation purposes, employees’ performance is generally evaluated using objective performance
measures3 and subjective performance measures4. Subjectivity can be assimilated into

Employers often use objective performance measures to evaluate employees’ performance when employees’ tasks
are quantifiable and verifiable (Woods 2012). An example of an objective performance measure is the total sales
dollars sold by a salesperson in a fiscal year.
4
Subjective performance measures are used when there is a lack of objective measures to evaluate performance
(Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus 2004). The use of subjective performance measures can benefit both
3
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performance evaluations through: 1) incorporating ex-post discretionary adjustments to account
for non-contractable factors that occurred during the contracting period, 2) providing employers
with ex-post flexibility over the weights of objective performance measures, and 3) the use of
subjective performance measures (Bol 2008). Ex-post discretionary adjustments and ex-post
flexibility over weights of objective performance measures provide employers with the ex-ante
ability to mitigate the effects of uncontrollable events on employees’ objective performance
measures (Bol et al. 2015; Arnold and Artz 20015; Ederhof 2010; Gibbs et al. 2004). In contrast,
subjective performance measures provide employers with the ability to perform more
comprehensive performance evaluations based on criteria that, while not objective in nature, are
important to the assessment of the employees’ performance (Moers 2005; Bol 2008; Wick 2021).
2.2.2 Advantages of Subjectivity
In this section I discuss the advantages of incorporating subjectivity into compensation
contracts and the performance evaluation process. It is advantageous to incorporate subjectivity
into contracts in which employees perform subjective tasks because it provides measures,
although nonobjective, for employers to evaluate their employees with. Subjectivity is also
advantageous in employment contracts where employees perform objective tasks as it provides
employers with flexibility to alter the weight of specific performance measures, or the amount of
compensation provided based on information that is not available ex-ante (Bol 2008; Wick
2021). The key advantages of including subjectivity into compensation contracts that are
discussed by prior literature include: 1) it acts as a barrier to employees’ manipulation of
objective performance measures, 2) it encourages adaptive effort, 3) it reduces the risk of

employers and employees for tasks that are not easily quantifiable and verifiable. Some examples include aesthetic
website designs, effective leadership, good use of resources, and “adequate planning” (Moers 2005).
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external noise, 4) it alleviates incentive distortion, and 5) it mitigates unfairness perceptions (Bol
2008; Wick 2021).
The first advantage of subjectivity is that it acts as a barrier to employees’ manipulation
of objective performance measures (Bol 2008). Executives, for example, are motivated to engage
in earnings manipulations because accounting income is often a key objective measure used to
evaluate their performance (Habib and Hansen 2008; Kong, Qin, Yang, and Zhang 2021). By
having ex-ante knowledge of the specific objective performance measures that their performance
and compensation are evaluated on, employees have been found to manipulate earnings (e.g.,
Holthause, Larcker, and Sloan 1995; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dichev, Graham, Harvey,
Rajgopal 2013). Subjectivity enables employers to deter employees from engaging in these
practices because they have ex-ante knowledge about these adjustments in their employment
contracts (Bol 2008).
The second advantage of subjectivity is that it encourages adaptive effort by allowing
employers to integrate unforeseen information into the performance evaluation that is not
available ex-ante (Bol 2008). In environments characterized by unpredictability, employers may
more successfully align organizational goals with employee goals and motivate them to be more
adaptive by using subjectivity such as subjective performance weights. Höppe and Moers (2011)
provide evidence that CEO compensation contracts are more likely to encompass subjective
weights when their organizations operate in unpredictable environments.
The third benefit of subjectivity is that it reduces the risk of external noise contaminating
employees’ performance by providing employers with the ability to revise employees’
compensation contracts to account for environmental changes and to counteract the effects of
uncontrollable events (Bol 2008). Often, extraneous factors can diminish the link between
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employees’ effort and their objectively measured performance. The weakened link makes the
objective performance measures a noisy and inaccurate proxy for the employees’ effort. For
example, division profits, a common objective performance measure, may be down mainly
because of the COVID-19 pandemic and does not reflect employees’ lower efforts. Therefore,
incorporating ex-post adjustments and/or the subjective weighting of performance measures into
employment contracts ex-ante permits employers to filter out the effects of uncontrollable events
on objective performance measures. This capability is imperative to facilitate the appropriate
response to environmental changes and allows employers to do this without having to renegotiate
the compensationt contract (Bol 2008). For example, in their archival study, Bol, Keune,
Matsumura and Shin (2010) find that employers use their discretion to provide easier targets to
stores facing higher (vs. lower) level of environmental uncertainty and risk.
The fourth benefit of subjectivity is that it mitigates incentive distortion in compensation
contracts in which not all tasks are easily measurable, observable, or verifiable (Holmstrom
1979; Holmström and Milgrom 1991; Feltham and Xie 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bol 2008;
Arnold 2021). Incentive distortion occurs when employees focus on the tasks that their
performance is evaluated on to the detriment of their other tasks and organizational goals
(Holmström and Milgrom 1991; Choi, Hecht, and Tayler 2012). For example, Gibbs et al (2004)
find that in an auto dealership, subjective evaluations alleviate goal incongruence and incentive
distortion, and improve employee satisfaction and performance.
The fifth benefit of subjectivity is that it has the potential of improving employees’
fairness perceptions (Bol 2008; Voußem, Kramer and Schäffer 2016). Subjectivity assists the
employer in increasing employees’ fairness perceptions by enabling them to integrate ex-post
information to the evaluation that was unavailable ex-ante. By neutralizing the effects of
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unforeseen events, subjectivity enables employers to align the results of employees’ performance
evaluations more closely with their true performance. Many prior studies find that employees’
motivation and performance are affected by their fairness perceptions of both the process and
outcomes of the performance evaluation (see Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter and Ng 2001 for
review).
2.2.3 Disadvantages of Subjectivity
Although there are many advantages of incorporating subjectivity into compensation
contracts, its inclusion may also trigger a series of disadvantages or costs. These disadvantages
can be assimilated into the following categories: 1) intentional misapplication of subjectivity by
evaluators, 2) unintentional misapplication of subjectivity by evaluators and 3) undesirable
responses to subjectivity from employees (Prendergast and Topel 1993). I review the literature
pertaining to these categories below.
There is a vast stream of accounting literature that examines the intentional
misapplication of subjectivity by supervisors who perform performance evaluations on behalf of
their employers. Supervisors may act in their own self-interests and intentionally misapply
subjectivity because they face high information gathering costs to perform accurate performance
evaluations, but the costs of inaccurate evaluations reside with the employer (i.e., owners of the
organization) (Prendergast and Topel 1993; Prendergast 1999; Moers 2005; Bol 2008; Wick
2021). Prior studies have found that these high information gathering costs lead supervisors to
engage in leniency bias (i.e., inflating employees’ performance ratings), centrality bias (i.e.,
clustering all employees’ performance ratings together which results in less variance in
performance than is warranted) or both (Moers 2005; Bol 2011; Golman and Bhatia 2012; Du,
Tang, and Young 2012; Du, Erkens, Young and Tang 2018; Demeré, Sedatole and Woods 2019;
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Grabner, Künneke and Moers 2020). In the case of leniency bias, Bol et al. (2010) find
supervisors set lowers targets for managers with greater status. Similarly, Du et al. (2012)
reported that supervisors are more lenient to employees who have higher political rank in the
organization and whose location is more proximate to corporate headquarters. As for centrality
bias, Golman and Bhatia (2012) find that supervisors compress performance ratings when
uncertainty is high, and Bol et al. (2015) find that centrality is high when information
transparency is low. Both leniency and centrality bias are examined by Bol (2011), who finds
that information gathering costs and strong manager-employee relationships increase leniency
and centrality biases, but these biases may not be detrimental to compensation contracts as
leniency bias is positively associated to future performance. In addition, Demeré et al. (2019)
examine both leniency and centrality biases and find that the use of calibration committees in the
performance evaluation process decreases leniency bias but exacerbates centrality bias.
Centrality bias is increased by calibration committees because they have a strong preference of
making downward adjustments to extremely high ratings.
A second disadvantage of subjectivity is that evaluators may unintentionally misapply
subjectivity in the performance evaluation process. As a result, subjectivity may decrease the
accuracy of performance evaluations because the supervisor conducting the performance
evaluation may have cognitive limitations and may take mental shortcuts (Bol 2008; Wick 2021).
One such limitation is termed common measures bias, which exemplifies supervisors’ tendency
to unintentionally downplay the importance of unique performance measures with measures that
are common to all business units (Lipe and Salterio 2000; Libby, Salterio, and Webb 2004).
Another limitation is the spillover effect in which supervisors use the results of objective
performance measures in their subjective assessments (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher,
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Schulz, and Rotaru 2018). Similarly, the outcome effect refers to supervisors unintentionally
integrating employees’ final outcomes into their subjective assessments (Brazel, Jackson,
Schaefer and Stewart 2016). Lastly, supervisors have been found to be susceptible to escalation
of commitment. For example, Kramer and Maas (2020) find that supervisors rate their
employees more favorably after they recommend those employees for a promotion. Taken
together, common human information processing deficiencies can create inaccuracies in
performance evaluations.
Finally, the third disadvantage of subjectivity is that it imposes costs on employees by
increasing the level of uncertainty they face in the performance evaluation process (Bol 2008).
Subjectivity increases employees’ reliance on their supervisors’ judgement and motivations. For
employees to view subjectivity positively, they must have confidence that their supervisors will
utilize their discretion fairly and free of distortions (Baiman and Rajan 1995). The level of
uncertainty that employees’ experience over their supervisors’ use of discretion could
inadvertently dilute the incentive effects inherent within performance evaluations (Holmström
1979). Employees’ perceptions of their supervisors’ use of discretion are thus an important
aspect of subjectivity to investigate and is central to my study.
To summarize, there are many advantages and disadvantages of including subjectivity in
compensation contracts. On the positive side, subjectivity may: 1) act as a barrier to employees’
manipulation of objective performance measures, 2) encourage adaptive effort, 3) reduce the risk
of external noise, 4) alleviate incentive distortion, and 5) mitigate unfairness perceptions (Bol
2008; Wick 2021). On the negative side, subjectivity may: 1) be intentionally misapplied by
evaluators, 2) be unintentionally misapplied by evaluators, and 3) lead to undesirable responses
from employees.
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2.2.4 Ex-post Discretionary Adjustments
In this section, I review literature pertaining to ex-post discretionary adjustments, the
particular method of subjectivity that I study in this dissertation. Prior studies examining ex-post
discretionary adjustments can be organized into two categories: 1) factors influencing
supervisors’ use of ex-post discretionary adjustments and 2) employees’ reactions to ex-post
discretionary adjustments. In section 2.2.4.1, I review studies that examine factors influencing
supervisors’ use of ex-post discretionary adjustments and in section 2.2.4.2, I analyze studies
examining employees’ reactions to ex-post discretionary adjustments.
2.2.4.1 Factors Influencing Supervisors’ Use of Discretionary Adjustments
A large literature stream in accounting has studied the factors that influence supervisors’
use of ex-post discretionary adjustments. This literature stream can be subdivided into studies
that investigate: 1) the use of ex-post discretionary adjustments to reduce the noise inherent in
objective performance measures, 2) the prevalence of using ex-post discretionary adjustments at
the organizational level, 3) external and management control features that influence supervisors’
use of ex-post discretionary adjustments, and 4) employee characteristics that influence the
supervisors’ use of ex-post discretionary adjustments. I will review each of these categories
below.
Several accounting studies show that supervisors make ex-post discretionary adjustments
to negate the noise inherent in objective performance measures. For example, Anderson et al.
(2020) use archival and survey data from a retail organization that utilizes both objective and
subjective measures. They find that supervisors provide larger ex-post discretionary adjustments
to employees whose objective performance measures are noisier. Similarly, Höppe and Moers
(2011) find that the greater the noise level within objective performance measures, the greater
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the likelihood that organizations will incorporate ex-post discretionary adjustments into their
employment contract. Lastly, Bol et al. (2015) study whether compensation interdependence and
future event likelihood influence supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions to
neutralize the effects of a negative uncontrollable event in the current period. They report that
when future event likelihood is high, supervisors are less likely to perform ex-post discretionary
adjustments. Bol et al. (2015) conject supervisors fail to make ex-post discretionary adjustments
to induce adaptive behavior.
The prevalence of ex-post discretionary adjustments in compensation contracts was
explored in one of the first subjectivity studies in accounting. Merchant (1989) analyzes survey
data and finds that the adoption of ex-post discretionary adjustments differs from organization to
organization. While some organizations use ex-post discretionary adjustments to completely
counteract the effect of uncontrollable events, other organizations never utilize these
contractually available adjustments. Similarly, Höppe and Moers (2011) examine organizations’
SEC Proxy Statements and find that approximately 24% of organizations who disclose the
availability of ex-post discretionary adjustments in their contract actually use these adjustments
as part of the performance evaluation process. Further to this, Arnold and Artz (2015) use survey
and archival data from 97 German organizations and find that organizations differ in their use of
within-period adjustments to performance measures (degree of target flexibility). On an
international scale, the use of ex-post discretionary adjustments differs from country to country.
Chinese organizations are most likely to incorporate subjectivity into their contracts, followed by
US organizations, and the least likely to use subjectivity are Dutch firms (Jansen, Merchant and
Van der Stede 2009; Merchant, Van der Stede, Lin and Yu 2011). These studies establish that
even in organizations where ex-post discretionary adjustments are incorporated into their
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contracts, there is great variability in supervisors’ willingness to make these ex-post
discretionary adjustments.
Some studies examine external and management control features that influence
supervisors’ use of ex-post discretionary adjustments. Using experimental data, Bol et al. (2015)
find that supervisors are less likely to make ex-post discretionary adjustments when
compensation interdependence is present (i.e., the bonus pool is shared) than when compensation
interdependence is absent (i.e., each employees’ bonus is derived from an individual bonus
pool). The nature of the joint bonus prevents supervisors from performing ex-post discretionary
adjustments because a positive adjustment for one employee yields a negative adjustment for the
other employee (Bol et al. 2015). Another experimental study by Majerczyk and Thomas (2021)
finds that in situations where performance risk is outside of the employees’ control, supervisors
are more likely to sympathize with disadvantaged employees than employees who are at an
advantage. However, this sympathy is reversed, and supervisors are prone to favor the
advantaged employee when supervisors have resource allocation responsibilities. This reversal
may occur because supervisors use their bonus allocation decisions to justify their resource
allocation decisions. Additionally, Martin and Thomas (2022) experimentally find that
supervisors exert less effort setting targets and set more difficult performance targets when expost discretionary adjustments are part of the compensation contract. They rationalize that this
occurs because supervisors understand that they can utilize ex-post discretionary adjustments as
a vehicle to correct any problematic targets. Lastly, in a field study, Woods (2012) finds that
supervisors are more willing to make positive ex-post discretionary adjustments for negative
events that reward employees (i.e., increase their compensation) than to make negative
adjustments for positive events that will punish employees (i.e., decrease their compensation).
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These findings indicate that supervisors are influenced by contextual factors and management
control characteristics when making ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions.
Employee characteristics also influence supervisors’ propensity to make ex-post
discretionary adjustments. For example, using archival data, Aranda, Arellano and Davila (2019)
find that supervisors provide greater subjective bonuses to employees who set more difficult
targets for themselves. Further, they find that this increase in ex-post discretionary adjustments is
used to reward these employees for their commitment to difficult targets rather than to reduce the
noise in the performance measures. Supervisors are also influenced by employees’ prior
objective performance when making ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions. In a field study,
Woods (2012) finds that supervisors are more likely to make ex-post discretionary adjustments
when employees’ current year’s objective performance is significantly lower than their prior
year’s performance. An experimental study by Maske, Sohn and Hirsch (2019) examines how
supervisors use ex-post discretionary adjustments to reduce employees’ bonuses as a punishment
for engaging in unethical behavior. They find that supervisors make greater (smaller) ex-post
discretionary adjustments to employees’ bonuses for unethical behavior when the employees’ exante objective performance is low (high). These findings show that the characteristic of
employees, including their prior behaviors, influence supervisors’ use of ex-post discretionary
adjustments.
The reviewed studies on ex-post discretionary adjustments examine: 1) how the noise
inherent in objective performance measures affects supervisors’ use of ex-post discretionary
adjustment, 2) the prevalence and actual use of ex-post discretionary adjustments in employment
contracts, 3) the external and management control factors that influence supervisors use of expost discretionary adjustments, and 4) employee characteristics that influence the supervisors’
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use of ex-post discretionary adjustments. The results of these studies indicate that there are many
instances in which supervisors forgo their ability to make ex-post discretionary adjustments.
Furthermore, according to Bol (2008), even when supervisors perform these adjustments, they
may make biased adjustments due to their cognitive limitations and motivated reasoning (Bol
2008) which may intensify the level of uncertainty for employees and increase the inaccuracies
in the performance assessment.
2.2.4.2 Employees Reactions to Ex-Post Discretionary Adjustments
In this section I review a small but growing literature stream that studies employees’
reactions to their supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions. These studies examine:
1) the effects of upward and downward ex-post discretionary adjustments on employees’ fairness
evaluations and future effort, and 2) the moderating effects of the employee-employer
relationship on how employees react to upward and downward ex-post discretionary
adjustments.
A seminal study examining employees’ fairness perceptions and future effort in reaction to
the availability and use of ex-post discretionary adjustments is an experimental study conducted
by Kelly et al. (2015). They find employees’ (whose initial goals are moderately but not highly
difficult) fairness perceptions, and in turn their performance, increase when ex-post discretionary
adjustments are used to counteract the effects of uncontrollable events. Likewise, Cai, Gallani
and Shin (2019) utilize a field study and find that employees who receive positive ex-post
discretionary adjustments, increase their performance in subsequent periods. In contrast,
employees’ performance decreases if they receive negative ex-post discretionary adjustments
that reduce their compensation. Cai et al. (2019) explain that employees react in this manner to
reciprocate their supervisors’ actions and to restore equity. Similarly, in an experimental study,
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Wong (2019) explores whether the availability of ex-post discretionary adjustments influences
employees’ justice perceptions and performance. He finds that employees’ perceptions of both
procedural and distributive justice decline when their performance is not adjusted for negative
uncontrollable events. He further finds that both explanations and perspective taking can be used
as strategies to counteract this decline. In contrast, Arnold and Artz (2015) results conflict with
the findings of the other studies that examine employees’ reactions to ex-post discretionary
adjustments. In particular, the results of their survey infer a negative relationship between
organizational performance, the likelihood of adjustments, and target flexibility. They conclude
that the availability of adjustments leads employees to form expectations that their supervisors
will make these adjustments. Once employees expect that their supervisors will make
adjustments, they are able to act opportunistically and withhold their effort without worrying
about performance consequences5. These studies provide preliminary evidence that ex-post
discretionary adjustments influence employees’ justice evaluations and future performance.
Another area of research in this field studies how various aspects of the employeeemployer relationship moderate how employees react to upward and downward ex-post
discretionary adjustments. For example, Burt et al. (2019) experimentally find that whether
employees identify (vs. do not identify) with their supervisors can negate the negative effects
that downward ex-post discretionary goal adjustments have on employees’ expectancy of reward
and their performance. This effect occurs because when employees identify with their
supervisors, they trust their supervisors to appropriately use ex-post discretionary adjustments.
Similarly, using an experimental study, Dierynck and van Pelt (2021) examine whether

5

It is important to note that Arnold and Artz (2015) study intra-period adjustments and not ex-post adjustments.
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employees’ preference for performance-based pay varies whether employees identify (vs. do not
identify) with the organization’s objectives and the availability of ex-post discretionary
adjustments. They find that when ex-post discretionary adjustments are available, employees’
who identify (vs. do not identify) with the organization’s objectives prefer performance-based
pay because they are willing to exert higher effort to meeting these objectives. Dierynck and van
Pelt (2021) rationalize that this occurs because employees expect their supervisors to protect
them from the adverse effects of uncontrollable events.
In summary, the literature on employees’ reactions to ex-post discretionary adjustments is
small but growing. Prior studies find that the availability of ex-post discretionary adjustments
affect employees’ justice evaluations and future performance differently depending on a
multitude of factors including their relationship with their supervisors, whether they identify with
their organization’s goals, and goal difficulty. Another line of literature shows that the employeeemployer relationship moderates the effect that ex-post discretionary adjustments have on
employee performance.
2.3 Fairness Heuristic Theory and Performance
As discussed above, prior research on employees’ reactions to ex-post discretionary
adjustment finds that ex-post discretionary adjustments may affect employees’ justice
evaluations and future effort. In this section, I examine employees’ justice evaluations through
the lens of fairness heuristic theory. In Section 2.3.1, I provide an overview of fairness heuristic
theory and how employees evaluate justice in work settings. In Section 2.3.2, I review both
psychology and accounting studies that examines the link between employees’ justice
evaluations and performance.
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2.3.1 Overview of Fairness Heuristic Theory
Distributive justice as a construct evolved from equity theory (Adams 1965; Folger 1977)
and has been integrated into fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001, Van den Bos 2001).
Individuals’ perceptions of distributive justice are calculated by comparing their inputs (what
they invest into the job) and outcomes (what they receive from the job) relative to those of a
referent (Adams, 1965; Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Deutsch 1985). The referent choice varies
based on the availability of information and the relevance of the referent. Individuals may use
self-referents or other referents for these evaluations (Goodman 1974; Levine and Moreland
1987; Kulik and Ambrose 1992). When the input-outcome ratio is equal, individuals’ perceptions
of distributive justice are high. When individuals assess the ratio to be inequitable, they will
experience distress and become motivated to take action to restore their distributive justice
evaluations (Adams 1965; Austin and Walster 1974; Cook and Hegtvedt 1983). Employees can
restore their distributive justice evaluations by changing their input level to match the outcomes
that they receive. For example, Garland (1973) finds that underpaid workers produce work of
lower quality than workers that are paid equitably. Similarly, Middlemist and Peterson (1976)
find that individuals will deliberately choose an effort level that facilitates an equitable exchange.
Fairness heuristic theory stipulates that most justice evaluations are based on a mental
shortcut or heuristic that is created when an employee initially evaluates the organization for
which they work (Van den Bos 2001; Lind 2001; Van den Bos et al. 2001)6. According to
fairness heuristic theory, there are two stages of justice evaluations: 1) the judgement phase and
2) the usage phase. In the judgement phase, employees form their justice judgements (heuristics)

6

Although fairness heuristic theory may evaluate different facets of justice (i.e., distributive justice, procedural
justice, interactional justice, overall justice) my study focuses only on distributive justice consistent with Lind et al.
2001.
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while in the usage phase, employees utilize their newly formed heuristic to evaluate justice. The
heuristic nature of justice judgements is adaptive in that it prevents employees from constantly
engaging in effortful thinking and evaluations. Complex justice judgements may deplete
employees’ limited cognitive resources while the heuristic serves as a mental shortcut that does
not place a cognitive strain on employees (Van den Bos 2001; Lind 2001; Van den Bos et al.
2001).
Fairness heuristic theory holds that employees move very quickly from the judgement
phase to the usage phase of the evaluation process. Employees usually assume that this initial
justice evaluation is accurate and will evaluate all new information based on their newly
established fairness heuristic. In addition, fairness heuristic theory further argues that employees’
evaluations of justice are episodic and intermittent. As such employees seldom enter or stay in
the judgement phase of evaluation. Instead, they only evaluate fairness when they first meet their
employer or when something propels them back into the judgement phase. The adherence to this
heuristic is strongly motivated and employees will reinterpret and assimilate any new justice
relevant information to be consistent with their existing fairness heuristic.
As a result, this heuristic is vulnerable to primacy effects (i.e., the information that is
presented first has the biggest impact) (Lind, Kray and Thompson 2001; Lind 2019). For
example, Tyler and Lind (1992) find that employees are more likely to continually obey their
supervisors’ orders if they initially view the supervisor as fair. This finding is accentuated by
Lind et al. (2001) finding that justice evaluations are formed based on early justice information
versus subsequent justice information. They find that the timing of the fairness experience
influences employees’ fairness evaluations. In particular, employees are more likely to evaluate
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their supervisors as unfair if they are first treated unfairly and subsequently treated fairly than if
they are first treated fairly and later treated unfairly.
Rather than evaluating each element of justice separately, fairness heuristic theory
stipulates that employees’ initial evaluations of a single element of justice (i.e., procedural,
distributive, interactional, etc.) becomes their proxy for all other elements of justice (Van den
Bos 2001; Lind 2001; Van den Bos et al. 2001). As a result, the fairness heuristic is also
vulnerable to the substitutability effect (i.e., employees will substitute one element of justice for
another). Qin, Ren, Zhang and Johnson (2015) find that employees’ evaluations of their
interactions with their supervisors (interactional justice) predict their evaluations of both
procedural and distributive justice. This finding is accentuated by Lind, Kulik, Ambrose and de
Vera Park (1993) who find that individuals are more likely to accept the judgement of a court or
arbitration as fair if they view the procedure used to determine the judgement as fair. Similarly,
Van den Bos et al. (1997) find that the element of justice that is introduced first is used to form
the fairness heuristic. For example, when distributive justice information is introduced first, it
forms the basis of the fairness heuristic but if procedural justice information is provided first, the
fairness heuristic is shaped by this procedural information and the subsequent distributive
information is dismissed. This study finds that employees experience a significant level of inertia
in changing their early justice judgements and prefer to disregard or reinterpret new information
to be consistent with their existing fairness heuristic than to reassess their fairness heuristic (Van
den Bos et al 1997). These studies show that fairness evaluations are susceptible to both primacy
and substitutability effects. Thus, employees’ initial and single element of justice (e.g.,
distributive justice) evaluations can “spill over” to their future behaviors and their evaluations of
other elements of justice.
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Once employees form their fairness evaluations, they enter the usage stage where they
will rely on their preestablished fairness heuristic to evaluate justice. Employees will remain in
the usage phase of the fairness heuristic until an unexpected or important event triggers a shift
back to the judgmental phase. The theory stipulates employees will not consider new justice
information to revise their fairness heuristic when they are in the usage phase (Lind 2001;
Colquitt and Zipay 2015). Employees are strongly resistant to re-enter the judgement phase and
are motivated to cognitively restructure reality to align with their existing fairness heuristic.
Additionally, prior studies find that when individuals feel that they cannot escape a situation or
change their internal or external environment, they become strongly motivated to view the
situation as fair and ignore information that may lead them back to the judgement phase.
For example, Kay, Gaucher, Peach, Laurin, Friesen, Zanna and Spencer (2009) find that
individuals are motivated to see the status quo as the most desirable situation even in light of
evidence of inequality and discrimination. Similarly, Laurin, Kay, Proudfoot and Fitzsimons
(2013) find that the stability of the external environment reduces individuals’ desire to support
redistributive programs whose goal is to correct inequities. In addition, Laurin, Shepherd and
Kay (2010) find that women who are led to believe that emigrating from Canada is difficult are
more likely to attribute pay inequities to valid biological differences between men and woman
than to system unfairness compared to women who believe emigrating from Canada is easy.
Similarly, the greater the likelihood that a future event is forecasted as inevitable, the more likely
it will be perceived as fair (Proudfoot and Lind 2015; Kay and Zanna 2009). This is further
illustrated by Kay, Jimenez, and Jost (2002) who experimentally find that both winning and
losing outcomes are seen as more desirable the higher the perceived likelihood of them occurring
becomes.
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In summary, employees’ fairness heuristics are formed in the judgement phase, based on
initial information that they receive on any element of justice. Employees move very quickly
from the judgement phase to the usage phase, in which they apply the fairness heuristic to align
new justice information with the heuristic and substitute this heuristic to evaluate all other
elements of justice. Employees are only motivated to re-evaluate their fairness heuristics when
an important or unexpected event shifts them away from the usage phase back to the judgement
phase.
2.3.2 Justice Evaluations and Employee Performance
Above I summarized the literature on how employees form their justice evaluations
through the lens of fairness heuristics theory. In this section I examine how justice evaluations
can influence employees’ performance and workplace deviance behavior. Prior psychology
studies find that employees’ future job performance and workplace deviance behaviors are
related to their perceptions of justice, in general, and distributive justice, specifically (Proudfoot
and Lind 2015; Colquitt, Noe, and Jackson 2002; Lind, Kanfer, and Early 1990; Fox, Spector,
and Miles, 2001)7. For example, Lind, Kanfer and Early (1990) experimentally find that fairness
judgements predict future performance, with high fairness perceptions leading to higher
performance and low fairness perceptions leading to decreased performance. Similarly, a surveybased study by Hendrix, Robbins, Miller and Summers (1999) shows that distributive justice also
affects employees’ workplace deviance behavior and performance. They find that employees’
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It is important to note that several meta-analyses find a weak correlation between distributive justice and
performance (Colquitt et al. 2001; Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001). One explanation for this weak correlation is
provided by Lind (2015) who explains that since most prior studies examine procedural justice and distributive
justice together, the level of procedural justice reported will have a strong primacy effect. The procedural justice
information may become the basis of the fairness heuristic and if the distributive justice information presented is not
distinct or important enough, participants may not properly assess this information.
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work performance, attendance, turnover intentions, job satisfaction and organizational
commitment are influenced by their distributive justice perceptions.
A growing literature stream in accounting examines the relationship between employees’
justice evaluations and performance.8 These studies can be organized into two categories: 1)
studies that look at performance as the dependent variable; and 2) studies that look at other
psychological factors like task satisfaction, job satisfaction or organizational commitment as the
dependent variable.
Several accounting studies explore the link between justice and performance in budget
settings. For example, in an experiment, Lindquist (1995) finds that although both procedural
and distributive justice information does not affect performance, each measure of justice
influences the subjects’ perceptions of the other measure, and each justice measure affects
participants’ level of task satisfaction. Libby (2001) builds on the Linquist (1995) study and
experimentally finds when both distributive and procedural justice are low, subjects' performance
is lower than in all other conditions. Interestingly, in this study, Libby presents the distributive
justice information first and finds that when distributive justice is high, procedural justice has no
effect on performance, which aligns with fairness heuristic theory.
The link between organizational justice and performance is also examined by Burney,
Henle, and Widener (2009) using archival data from an organization’s performance measurement
system. They find that high levels of organizational justice are associated with employee
performance. On the other hand, an experimental study by Kelly et al. (2015) explores the
relationship between goal difficulty, the availability of ex-post discretionary adjustments,
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Many prior accounting studies examine both procedural and distributive justice simultaneously. Although my
study focuses solely on distributive justice, in this section I review the findings on both procedural and distributive
justice to provide a complete overview of the accounting studies discussed.

29

distributive justice, and performance. They find that difficult goals result in lower distributive
justice evaluations than moderate goals. However, they do not find a relationship between
distributive justice and the use of ex-post discretionary adjustments, and performance. Lastly,
Wong (2019) utilizes a laboratory experiment and finds that participants’ perceptions of
distributive justice and performance decrease after they do not receive an ex-post discretionary
adjustment. These studies illustrate that a link between distributive justice and performance
exists.
A few accounting studies examine the link between justice and other outcome variables
such as task satisfaction, job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Parker and Kohlmeyer
(2005) use survey data and find that fairness perceptions influence employees’ turnover
intentions, level of organizational commitment and job satisfaction. Using a field study, Wentzel
(2002) finds that employees’ fairness perceptions positively affect goal commitment which in
turns has a positive effect on performance.
In summary, both psychology and accounting literature have explored the influence that
employees’ justice evaluations have on performance and other important outcome variables.
Many studies have found a positive link between employees’ distributive justice evaluations and
performance. Other studies have found a link between employees’ justice evaluations and task
satisfaction, job satisfaction and organizational commitment.
2.4 Psychological Contract and Employees’ Expectations
The use of ex-post discretionary adjustments may influence employees’ future effort and
workplace deviance, not only by affecting their distributive justice evaluations, but also by
influencing whether their supervisors’ use of adjustments is in breach of employees’ adjustment
expectations. Adjustment expectations comprise a part of the employees’ psychological contracts
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with their employer. In this section I explore psychological contracts that employees form with
their employers and the effects that these contracts may have on employees’ future effort and
workplace deviance behavior.
Psychological contracts are defined as “an individual’s belief in mutual obligations
between that person and another party such as an employer” (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p.
679). 9 Guest and Conway (2002) further refine the definition by stating that psychological
contracts are “the perception of both parties to the employment relationship, organization and
individual, of the reciprocal promises and obligations implied in that relationship” (Guest and
Conway, 2002, p. 22). The fact that these obligations are implied indicates that these
expectations are subjective and extend beyond the formal employment contract (Rousseau 1989;
Robinson 1996; Seeck and Parzefall 2008). Employees rely on these psychological contracts and
form expectations about their supervisors’ future behaviors based on these contracts. Inherent in
every psychological contract is the employees’ beliefs that they will be rewarded for their
performance and protected from negative shocks (Yang, Chen, Roy and Mattila 2020). However,
psychological contracts are only introspective in that supervisors are often unaware of the terms
that employees incorporate into their psychological contract, and vice versa. Consequently, each
party may have different beliefs about whether the terms and obligations of the psychological
contract have been fulfilled (Coyle-Shapiro, Costa, Doden, and Chang 2019).
Psychological contracts incorporate a range of transactional and relational terms. The
transaction component of the psychological contract comprises of detailed, short-term monetary
commitments (Morrison and Robinson 1997; Cavanaugh and Noe 1999). Transactional terms

9

Psychological contracts are not confined to just the relationship between the employee and employer. They may
exist between any person and another party. For example, two employees or the taxpayer and the tax authority Feld
and Frey 2007).
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within the psychological contracts are more concerned with economic exchange, for example,
fair compensation for job performance (Rousseau 1989). In contrast, relational terms “involves
broad, long-term obligations, and may be also based on the exchange of socioemotional elements
(e.g., commitment and trust) (Cavanaugh and Noe 1999, p.324).” An example of a relational
term commonly found in psychological contracts is the exchange of employee loyalty for career
advancement opportunities (Rousseau 1995).
If supervisors do not fulfill employees’ expectations, the employees will experience a
psychological contract breach. A psychological contract breach occurs when employees believe
that their employers have failed to fulfill a term of their psychological contract (Rousseau,1989;
Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998; Rosen, Chang, Johnson, and Levy 2009). The definition of a
psychological contract breach is “the cognition that one’s organization has failed to meet one or
more obligations within one’s psychological contract in a manner commensurate with one’s
contributions” (Morrison & Robinson 1997, p. 230). It is important to note that psychological
contract breaches involve employees’ judgment and evaluations of their supervisors’ behavior
versus their expectations (Coyle-Shapiro et al. 2019). A longitudinal study by Robinson and
Rousseau (1994) that survey employees two years apart finds that psychological contract
breaches are very common and 55% of their respondents experience a psychological contract
breach during their study. Similarly, Robinson’s (1996) longitudinal study that surveys
employees 2.5 years apart finds that the feelings of a psychological contract breach affect
employees’ subsequent contributions to their employers. Another 18-month long longitudinal
study by Robinson and Morrison (2000) further confirms that psychological contract breaches
are common and lead to intense feelings of violation.
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Prior studies have reported many negative effects of psychological contract breaches,
including decreases in employees’ job performance, job satisfaction, organizational citizenship
behavior, and higher turnover intentions among other variables (Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski and
Bravo 2007; Rosen, Chang, Johnson, and Levy 2009). For example, a meta-analysis performed
by Zhao et al. (2007) shows that psychological contract breaches are associated with lower job
performance, job satisfaction and organizational citizenship behavior as well as higher turnover
intentions. The results of another meta-analysis by Bal, De Lange, Jansen and Van Der Velde
(2008) shows that psychological contract breach is related to decreases in employee trust, job
satisfaction and affective commitment. Likewise, using survey data from 266 employees of a US
organization, Bal, Chiaburu, and Jansen (2010) find that psychological contract breaches
decrease employees’ job performance. In addition, Robinson and Rousseau (1994) find
psychological contract breaches are associated with higher turnover intentions and a reduction in
employee trust and job satisfaction.
Some studies on psychological contract breaches have specifically examined the effect of
psychological contract breach on workplace deviance. Workplace deviance is defined as
“voluntary behavior that violates significant organizational norms and, in so doing, threatens the
well-being of the organization or its members, or both” (Robinson and Bennett 1995 p. 556).
They are intentional acts that employees are motivated to engage in to restore equity (Aquino,
Lewis, and Bradfield 1999; Greenberg 1990) and can be classified as revenge seeking behavior
(Bies and Tripp 2001). There are many behaviors that fall under the umbrella of workplace
deviance including high absenteeism, leaving work early without permission, using work
equipment without permission, browsing the internet during work, etc. For example, Bordia,
Restubog and Tang (2008) use survey data from three studies to find that employees who
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experience a psychological contract breach are more likely to engage in revenge cognitions and
participate in workplace deviance like arriving late to work and taking undeserved breaks.
Similarly, Deery, Iverson and Walsh (2006) use survey data from Australian customer service
employees and find that employees who experience psychological contract breaches have higher
absenteeism rates (workplace deviance behavior) and lower organizational trust. Likewise,
Tepper, Carr, Breaux, Geider, Hu and Hua (2009) find that employees who experience abusive
supervision (a relational breach of the psychological contract) engage in great levels of
workplace deviance like intentionally working slower and calling in sick when not ill. These
studies show a link between psychological contract breach and workplace deviance where
employees retaliate against their employers.
In summary, there is a vast literature in organizational behavior that examines
psychological contracts, and the effects perceived breaches have on employees. This literature
shows that psychological contract breach has negative behavioral consequences on employees’
performance and workplace deviance behavior. As a result, it is important to examine the
availability of ex-post adjustments, not only as part of the employee compensation contract but
also as part of the psychological contract. It is imperative to determine if the failure to receive an
ex-post discretionary adjustment is viewed by employees as a psychological contract breach.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I review the accounting literature on subjectivity, in general, and ex-post
discretionary adjustments, in particular. I provide an overview of distributive justice literature
through the lens of fairness heuristic theory and discuss how it relates to my study’s outcome
variables, i.e., effort and workplace deviance. Lastly, I introduced the concept of psychological
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contracts and discuss how employees’ perceptions of a psychological contract breach affect their
effort and workplace deviance behaviors.
Overall, the existing literature specifies that although ex-post discretionary adjustments
have the ability to alleviate risk, decrease fairness concerns and increase incentive alignment,
they also can increase uncertainty for employees and result in inaccurate performance
evaluations. These costs arise from supervisors’ pre-existing biases and motivational objectives
that may prevent them from utilizing these adjustments properly. Thus, subjectivity may be
costly for employers and have negative consequences for employees. It is important to study a
setting in which supervisors have the ability to make ex-post discretionary adjustments but do
not because prior research shows that in many situations supervisors opt out of using ex-post
discretionary adjustments (Merchant 1989; Höppe and Moers 2011; Bol et al. 2015). It is thus
necessary to study how employees’ distributive justice perception and adjustment expectations
affect their future effort and workplace deviance behavior when they do not receive ex-post
discretionary adjustments. I develop my hypotheses in the next section and elaborate on these
matters.

35

CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study the effects of supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment
decisions on employees’ future effort and workplace deviance behaviors. In particular, I examine
a setting where unexpected negative events occur, and supervisors select not to make ex-post
discretionary adjustments. I draw on fairness heuristics theory, psychological contract theory,
and attribution theory to study how contextual features like future event likelihood and
compensation interdependence affect employees’ future effort and workplace deviance when expost discretionary adjustments are not provided.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 uses fairness heuristics theory to explain
how employees will use available information to derive their distributive justice evaluations. My
hypotheses about the effect of compensation interdependence on employee’s distributive justice
evaluations when future event likelihood is high and when future event likelihood is low are
presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 examines the link between psychological contract theory,
attribution theory, and employees’ adjustment expectations. It presents the predictions on the
effect of compensation interdependence on employees’ adjustment expectations when future
event likelihood is high and when it is low. In Section 3.5, I construct hypotheses about the effect
of compensation interdependence on employees’ future effort and workplace deviance behavior
in two settings, when future event likelihood is high and when future event likelihood is low.
Lastly, I conclude this chapter in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Fairness Heuristic Theory and Distributive Justice
Fairness heuristic theory stipulates that most justice10 evaluations are based on an
overarching mental shortcut or heuristic that is created when employees initially evaluate the
organizations that they work for (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose and de Vera Park 1993; Van den Bos
2001; Lind 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2001). According to this theory, rather than evaluating each
element of justice individually, employees form a global justice heuristic that they use to assess
all components of justice (Van den Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke 1997; Van den Bos, Lind,
Vermunt, and Wilke 1997). This heuristic is the basis of all justice decisions until certain
environmental changes (or “phase shifting events”) provoke employees to recalibrate their
fairness heuristics by evaluating new justice information (Proudfoot and Lind 2015). These
events activate an alarm phase that shifts employees from utilizing their existing fairness
heuristics (usage phase) and leads them to re-enter the judgement phase (Van den Bos 2001;
Lind 2001). While employees’ principal focus, in the usage phase, is to justify the current
system, once they enter the judgement phase, they can objectively and critically re-examine
justice based on new information (Tost and Lind 2010). The alarm phase, that prompts
employees into the judgement phase, is seldom activated because the judgement phase requires
high level thinking and is cognitively draining (Van den Bos 2001; Lind 2001; Van den Bos et al
2001). This activation occurs when the nature of the change is perceived as distinct and
dramatically negative (Van den Bos and Lind 2009). Fairness heuristic theory specifies that
employees’ evaluations of distributive justice will vary based on whether they are utilizing their

10

I use the terms fariness and justice interchangeably in my dissertation following Cohen-Charash and Spector
(2001) and Colquitt et al. (2001).
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pre-established fairness heuristic or integrating new information to form successive justice
evaluations.
3.3 The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Distributive Justice Evaluations
Employees’ fairness heuristics are initially shaped by procedural information (Lind et al.
2001; Lind 2019). The perceived fairness of the process used to evaluate and reward employees’
performance is reflected in employees’ procedural justice evaluations (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, and
Shaw 2006; Kelly et al. 2015). Prior studies find that the mere availability of ex-post
discretionary adjustments within the compensation contract leads employees to perceive their
organizations as fair (Kelly et al. 2015; Wong 2019). This primary assessment is integrated into
the employees’ fairness heuristic and may be used to evaluate all future justice evaluations (Lind
et al. 2001; Lind 2019). However, differences in future event likelihood will affect whether
employees remain in the heuristic usage phase or re-enter the judgement phase. Prior studies
have found that employees remain in the usage phase until an unexpected or important event
triggers a shift back to the judgment phase (Lind 2001; Colquitt and Zipay 2015).
When future event likelihood is high, employees will develop an understanding that the
unexpected negative event is almost certain to reoccur in future years. The imminent
reoccurrence of the event makes the current event less distinct (Stapel and Spears 1996; Stapel
and Winkielman1998) and less salient. Fairness heuristic theory postulates that events need to be
perceived as distinct to interfere with employees’ reliance on their pre-established fairness
heuristic, as this heuristic evokes strong primacy effects (Van den Bos 2001; Lind 2001; Van den
Bos et al 2001; Lind et al. 2001). The near certainty of the event’s reoccurrence leads employees
to remain in the usage stage of the fairness heuristic. Therefore, they will use their pre38

established fairness heuristic to evaluate the distributive justice of their supervisors’ ex-post
discretionary adjustment decisions.
Consequently, rather than engaging in higher level reflective and analytical thinking,
employees will dismiss any new justice relevant information and will succumb to system
justification to rationalize their supervisors’ decisions not to adjust their bonuses. One factor that
they may not consider is compensation interdependence. When compensation interdependence is
absent, bonuses come from independent pools that are not fixed such that a positive ex-post
discretionary adjustment for one employee does not impact the bonus of other employees. In
contrast, when compensation interdependence is present, the bonus pool is amalgamated and
fixed such that a positive ex-post discretionary adjustment for one employee results in a negative
ex-post discretionary adjustment for the other employees (Bol et al. 2015). However, I expect
that when event likelihood is high, employees will mainly use their pre-established fairness
heuristic to evaluate justice without considering information related to compensation
interdependence in their distributive justice evaluations. H1a formally states this null
expectation:
H1a: When future event likelihood is high, compensation interdependence will not
affect employees’ distributive justice evaluations.
On the other hand, when future event likelihood is low, employees will perceive the
unexpected negative event as more distinct and conspicuous because it is almost certain not to
reoccur. Low future event likelihood will make justice evaluations more salient in employees’
minds and will activate the alarm phase that shifts employees from the usage phase back into the
judgement phase of fairness heuristic processing (Lind 2001). Once employees enter the
judgement phase, they become more vigilant to new justice relevant information, including
details about their bonus outcome. Employees will compare the variance between their outcomes
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versus those of their peers. Any pay dispersion will probably prompt employees to engage in
deeper level, reflective and analytical thinking of what their bonuses could have been if their
supervisors made ex-post discretionary adjustments. Rather than relying on their pre-established
fairness heuristics, employees will re-evaluate the validity of this heuristic based on all newly
available information. This evaluation of distributive justice will replace their prior fairness
heuristic and will in turn become their new fairness heuristic (Van den Bos et al. 1997; Lind
2001; Colquitt and Zipay 2015).
One factor that may influence employees’ distributive justice evaluations is compensation
interdependence because the ex-post discretionary adjustment amount that they are eligible for is
directly affected by compensation interdependence. Evaluating compensation interdependence
will lead employees to assess fairness based on distributive justice information and may lead
them to compare their bonuses to the bonuses of their coworkers. This social comparison will
lead to different distributive justice evaluations. Specifically, I predict that employees will have
higher distributive justice evaluations when compensation interdependence is present than when
it is absent. This is because employees should be more understanding and supportive of their
supervisors’ decision not to make ex-post discretionary adjustments to their bonuses when these
adjustments will have a negative impact on their coworkers’ bonuses, compared with when such
adjustments have no effects on their coworkers’ bonuses. This is evidenced by prior studies that
find compensation interdependence creates a sense of cooperation between employees who do
not want to actively harm their coworkers (Wageman and Baker 1997; Godoy, Morales, and
Rodero 2013; Lill 2020). In addition, Colquitt and Zipay (2015) discuss that when individuals
think about fairness it shifts them from an individual mindset, that is characterized by selfinterested behavior, to a group mindset, that is characterized by a focus on group welfare. This
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focus on the group may lead employees to form different distributive justice evaluations based
on the compensation interdependence inherent within their bonus.
This leads me to hypothesize that when future event likelihood is low, employees’
distributive justice evaluations will vary across different levels of compensation
interdependence. Formally stated:
H1b: When future event likelihood is low, employees’ distributive justice
evaluations will be lower when compensation interdependence is absent than when
it is present.
3.4 The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Adjustment Expectations
In the previous section, I predict an ordinal interaction between future event likelihood
and compensation interdependence affecting distributive justice evaluations. In this section, I
examine another psychological factor, adjustment expectations, that is also influenced by future
event likelihood and compensation interdependence. Prior studies find that employees not only
evaluate the fairness of their supervisors’ decisions, but also assess whether their supervisors’
actions breach their construed psychological contracts (Zhao et al., 2007; Rosen et al. 2009). A
psychological contract is comprised of series of expectations that employees have about the
terms of their employment. These expectations are subjective and often are not formally agreed
to or even discussed between the employees and employers (Levinson 1962; Rousseau 1989;
Morrison and Robinson 1997). The aspect of psychological contracts that I examine in my study
is employees’ adjustment expectations. When ex-post discretionary adjustments are included in
formal employment contracts, employees develop adjustment expectations about the
unforeseeable events that they believe their supervisors are obliged to provide ex-post
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discretionary adjustment to nullify (Bol 2008). I expect that future event likelihood and
compensation interdependence will interact to influence employees’ adjustment expectations.
Based on Kelley’s Attribution Theory (1967; 1971;1972; 1973), employees make
different attribution about outcomes based on the consistency and distinctiveness of the
information they obtain (Kelley and Michela 1980). Employees are more likely to make external
(or situational) attributions if the outcome is distinct and are more likely to make internal (or
personal) attributions if the outcome is consistent over time (Kelley and Michela 1980). Based
on this theory, future event likelihood should affect employees’ attributions about the unexpected
negative event and thereby influence employees’ adjustment expectations.
When event likelihood is high, the negative unexpected event is not distinct and is high in
consistency so much so that it becomes integrated into the employees’ regular operating
environments. The low level of distinctiveness and high level of consistency will lead employees
to make internal attributions about the unforeseeable event and to assume responsibility for this
event (Kelly 1967; 1971;1972). Further, when making internal attributions of the negative
unexpected event, individuals will be less likely to focus on external factors including their coworkers’ bonuses, which will make them less influenced by compensation interdependence. This
prediction aligns with the attribution theory literature reviewed by a Hewett, Icon, Shantz,
Mundy and Alfes (2018) and the findings of Gerard (1963) and Misra’s (1973) that high event
consistency decreases individuals’ reliance on social comparison information. Therefore, I
formally hypothesize this null expectation in H2a: that:
H2a: When future event likelihood is high, compensation interdependence will not
affect employees’ adjustment expectations
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In contrast, when future event likelihood is low, the negative unexpected event is very
distinct and low in consistency because it is almost certain not to reoccur. In these circumstances,
employees are more likely to make external attributions about this negative event. When
employees make external attributions of the negative event, they are less likely to take
responsibility for the event and more likely to consider external factors such as their coworkers’
compensation. In such a situation, employees’ adjustment expectations should be higher when
compensation interdependence is absent versus present because when compensation
interdependence is absent, the ex-post discretionary adjustment has no effect on their coworkers’
bonuses. In contrast, when compensation interdependence is present, the ex-post discretionary
adjustment becomes a zero-sum game and employees should not expect their supervisors to harm
their coworkers (Bol et al. 2015). In summary, when future event likelihood is low, the effect
that ex-post discretionary adjustments have on the employees’ coworkers’ bonuses will affect
their adjustment expectations. My formal hypothesis is stated below:
H2b: When future event likelihood is low, employees will have higher adjustment
expectations when compensation interdependence is absent than when it is present.

3.5 The Effect of Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on Effort and
Workplace Deviance
In the preceding subsections, I develop hypotheses that predict future event likelihood
and compensation interdependence interact to influence employees’ distributive justice
evaluations and adjustment expectations. Prior research suggests that employees’ distributive
justice evaluations and adjustment expectations affect their future effort (Lind et al. 1990;
Hendrix et al. 1999; Libby 2001; Kelly et al. 2015; Wong 2019) and workplace deviance
behaviors (Frenkel, Restubog and Bednall 2012, Folger and Konovsky 1989; McFarlin and
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Sweeney 1992; Wentzel 2002; Lee and Allan 2002; Robinson and Bennett 1997; Greenberg and
Scott 1996; Greenberg 1990). Specifically, when employees’ evaluations of distributive justice
are low and/or their adjustment expectations are not met (i.e., their psychological contract is
breached), they will take actions to address these inequities.
Employees can either respond overtly to perceived injustice and unmet expectations by
reducing their effort or respond more covertly by increasing their workplace deviance.
Employees engage in workplace deviance behavior to retaliate against their employer and seek
revenge for perceived injustice or the violation of promises (Bies and Tripp 2001; Bordia et al.
2008). It is important to examine workplace deviance as a separate dependent variable because
prior studies find that employees may engage in workplace deviance behaviors in addition to
reducing their future effort in an attempt to restore their sense of equity (Bennett and Robinson
2003; Lawrence and Robinson 2007).
Thus, consistent with established research and my predictions about distributive justice
and adjustment expectations, I expect that employees’ future effort will be lower and workplace
deviance will be greater when compensation interdependence is absent than when it is present,
but only when future event likelihood is low (H3b and H4b) and not when it is high (H3a and
H3a). These expected differences occur because as argued in H1b and H2b, employees’
distributive justice evaluations will be lower, and their adjustment expectations will be higher
when compensation interdependence is absent versus present and future event likelihood is low.
These effects occur when future event likelihood is low because the unexpected event is
perceived as distinct, thus leading employees to re-evaluate their justice perceptions (Van den
Bos et al. 1997; Lind 2001; Colquitt and Zipay 2015). Employees will use their future effort and
workplace deviance as ways to restore distributive justice (Hendrix et al. 1999; Libby 2001) and
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revise the psychological contract (Wentzel 2002; Lee and Allan 2002). A graphical
representation of H3a and H3b can be found in Figure 1 and a graphical representation of H4a
and Hb can be found in Figure 2. H3a and H4a are null hypotheses. My hypotheses formally
stated are:
H3a: When future event likelihood is high, compensation interdependence will not
affect employees’ effort.
H3b: When future event likelihood is low, employees’ future effort will be lower
when compensation interdependence is absent than when it is present.

H4a: When future event likelihood is high, compensation interdependence will not
affect employees’ workplace deviance.
H4b: When future event likelihood is low, employees’ workplace deviance will be
higher when compensation interdependence is absent than when it is present.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
3.6 Summary
Based on existing theory and research from psychology and accounting, this chapter
develops four hypotheses. The objective of this research is to determine whether future event
likelihood (low versus high) and compensation interdependence (absent versus present) influence
employees’ future effort and workplace deviance via their effects on distributive justice and
adjustment expectations when their supervisors do not make ex-post discretionary adjustments.
Specifically, I predict that when event likelihood is low, employees’ distributive justice
evaluations and effort will be lower when compensation interdependence is absent than when
compensation interdependence is present. Likewise, I predict that when event likelihood is low,
employees’ adjustment expectations and workplace deviance behavior will be higher when
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compensation interdependence is present. In contrast, when future event likelihood is high, I
predict that compensation interdependence does not affect employees’ distributive justice
evaluations, adjustment expectations, future effort, and workplace deviance behavior.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD
4.1 Design Overview
I use a single online experiment to test my hypotheses. My experiment utilizes a 2 X 2
between subject design where I manipulate two levels of compensation interdependence (present
vs. absent) and two levels of future event likelihood (high vs. low). The experimental instrument
used in my experiment is adapted from a study by Bol et al. (2015)11 that examines managers’
use of ex-post discretionary adjustments for uncontrollable events under different levels of future
event likelihood and compensation interdependence. My study extends their line of research by
evaluating the employee’s perspective of ex-post discretionary adjustments and employees’
reactions to not receiving discretionary adjustments.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the details of the simulation,
Section 4.3 describes the experimental design and independent variables, Section 4.4 defines the
dependent and other measure variables and Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Simulation Details
4.2.1 Task
Participants complete a future effort determination task in a hypothetical case setting.
They assume the role of a Division Manager of LDV Manufacturing Inc., a regional
manufacturer of consumer goods products. The case asks participants to review the annual
performance information pertaining to their division, Division X, which informs them about the
net profit of Division X and an unforeseen event that negatively affected their profit. Participants
are advised that their supervisor has the discretion to adjust their initial profit-based bonus for the

11

I would like to thank Jasmijn Bol, Gary Hecht and Steven Smith for sharing their instrument with me.
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unforeseen event and must decide whether they expect their supervisor to make an adjustment
for them. Next, they are informed that their supervisor decided not to make an adjustment to their
bonus and are directed to determine their effort levels for next year and to complete a workplace
deviance scale. The experimental procedure is visually presented in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
4.2.2 Procedure
I programmed my experiment in Qualtrics and utilize the software’s randomization
feature to automatically randomize participants into four different conditions. My participants
access the link to the experiment in Prolific after they sign up for the study. They are
immediately randomized into an experimental condition once they click on the experimental
link. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the complete experimental instrument.
At the onset of the experiment participants read essential background information about
the organization that they need to imagine that they work for and their role. Participants are
instructed to assume the role of the manager of Division X of LDV Manufacturing Inc., an
organization that is divided into two divisions. Historically these divisions have been identical in
terms of market size, production volume and revenue. They are informed that they report to the
VP of the organization who supervises both Division X and Division Y. Next, they are advised
that their compensation package consists of a fixed salary and a performance bonus. Their bonus
is initially calculated based on their division’s profitability, but their supervisor has the discretion
to adjust it. Participants are then informed about the level of compensation interdependence
inherent in the organization’s performance management system, which is manipulated between
participants as either present or absent. On the subsequent screen participants are advised about
LDV’s total annual results and the individual results of Division X (their division) and Division
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Y. They are informed that their profit is lower than Division Y this year because their division
experienced a negative event that was completely outside of their control. The future likelihood
of the negative event is manipulated between participants. Participants are either informed that
the likelihood of these events reoccurring in the future is extremely high or extremely low. Next,
participants are presented with a graph that illustrates the differential in their bonus if their
supervisor leaves their compensation unadjusted versus if he makes an adjustment for the
unforeseen uncontrollable event.
To ensure that participants understand and remember the information presented to them,
they complete a ten-question comprehension check quiz. If the incorrect answer is chosen,
participants are informed that they answered the question incorrectly and the question is
repeated. If participants answer the question incorrectly the second time, a hint appears on the
screen that provides them with the correct answer that they then need to choose from the
multiple-choice selection. A similar approach has been used in prior literature (e.g. Berger, Guo,
and King 2020; Farrar and King 2022).
Once participants complete the comprehension check quiz, they are asked to take a few
minutes to consider their bonus expectations and fill out a Likert scale about whether they expect
a discretionary adjustment. Division X’s performance bonus is presented next, and participants
are advised that their supervisor did not make a discretionary adjustment. Participants are then
asked whether they will ask their supervisor to make a discretionary adjustment if they have an
opportunity to do so. The participants that answer yes to this question are asked to: 1) determine
the percentage of the total adjustment they will ask for, 2) to outline the arguments that they will
present to their supervisor to convince her to make the adjustment and 3) their effort levels next
year based on their supervisor’s response to the adjustment request. After completing these
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questions, participants are asked to answer the proceeding questions by imagining that they did
not ask their supervisor to make a discretionary adjustment and received the initial bonus amount
that their supervisor awarded them ($4,000).
For the participants that selected no when asked if they would ask for an adjustment, they
are reminded that they did not ask their supervisor for an adjustment. They are instructed to
answer the proceeding questions based on the initial bonus amount that their supervisor awarded
them ($4,000). The remaining screens are the same for all participants. Participants are asked to
complete multiple scales including: 1) distributive justice scale, 2) compensation satisfaction
scale, 3) an effort scale based on various adjustment scenarios and 4) a negative work behavior
scale12. After completing these scales, participants answer two attention check questions with an
opportunity to earn an extra £ 0.25 to ensure that they are still engaged in the experiment. Lastly
participants respond to a few demographic questions and psychological scales including an
equity sensitivity scale and a competitiveness scale.
4.2.3 Key Similarities and Differences Between My Study and Bol et al. 2015
The main experimental setting and independent variables manipulated in my study are
congruent with Bol et al. 2015. There are two division managers that report to the same
supervisor. One of the divisions experiences an uncontrollable event that has a negative impact
on their performance. The compensation system design provides their supervisor with the
discretion to adjust her employees’ bonuses and thus creates an opportunity for the supervisor to
adjust the bonuses for the negative event. Following the Bol et al. 2015 study, I manipulate

Participants also answered scales pertaining to: 1) their opinion of an average employee’s adjustment
expectations, 2) the adjustment amount an average employee would ask for from their supervisor and 3) the
importance of their bonus. I exclude these variables from my analysis because they do not provide any significant
results.
12
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between participants the future event likelihood (low vs. high) and compensation
interdependence (present vs. absent).
The main differences between my study and Bol et al. (2015) are that my study explores
this setting from the employee’s perspective while Bol et al. (2015) examines this situation from
the supervisor’s perspective. Whereas the Bol et al. (2015) study questions whether the
supervisor will make an adjustment to the employee’s bonus, my study investigates how the
employee will react to not receiving an ex-post discretionary adjustment. Therefore, my study
and the Bol et al. (2015) study examine different dependent variables. On one hand, in my study
I examine employees’ distributive justice evaluations, adjustment expectations, future effort and
workplace deviance after the employee receives the news that the bonus will not be adjusted. On
the other hand, the dependent variables in the Bol et al. (2015) study ask participants to
determine whether they will make an adjustment for the uncontrollable event and if so, how
much. Another key difference is that in my study the negative uncontrollable event occurs to the
employee whose division earns the lowest profit, while in the Bol et al. (2015) study the
uncontrollable event occurs to the employee whose division still manages to earn the highest
profit. Lastly, in my study the performance bonus is $4,000 while in the Bol et al. (2015) study
the bonus is $40,000.13
4.2.4 Participants
I recruited 200 participants using Prolific, an online research platform, that is similar to
Amazon Turk, but provides researchers with a higher level of transparency and a more
diversified participant pool (Palan and Schitter 2017; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat and Acquisti

13

The bonus amount was changed in my study due to participant responses in the pilot study. Specifically,
participants reported that their average annual salary is $34,000. I decreased the bonus amount in my main study to
ensure that it was more aligned to what study participants may receive in real life.
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2017). Many researchers have been successful in replicating prior studies using Prolific
participants, specifically, (Peer et al. 2017) and online platforms, in general (Farrell, Grenier and
Leiby 2017). This illustrates that online platforms provide researchers with a reliable participant
pool. Furthermore, Prolific is used by many accounting researchers including Wick (2020) and
Wynes (2021). To increase the quality of my participants, I used Prolific’s pre-established filters
to only make my study available to participants who have received an approval rating above 98%
on Prolific. In addition, as my instrument contained a lot of detailed information, it was essential
to ensure that participants could comprehend the facts and manipulations. As a result, I used a
Prolific filter to only make my experiment available to participants who identified that English is
their first language.
One of the key benefits of online platforms is that they allow researchers to select
participants with predefined characteristics that are imperative to address the research question
(Leiby, Rennekamp and Trotman 2019). Since the topic of my study is performance evaluations,
it was crucial for me to recruit participants that had at least one year of work experience, worked
in North America and were of a working age (between 21 and 65). Therefore, I used preestablished filters to narrow down my potential sample to satisfy these criteria. Once Prolific
filters out the participants, it makes the study available to them. Within the Prolific advertisement
participants are advised of the amount that they will earn for completing the study and once they
click on the study link, they are taken to Qualtrics to complete the study. Prolific expects
researchers to pay all the participants that select to participate and complete the study. Prolific
does not have a pre-existing filter that identifies whether participants had participated in a
performance evaluation meeting, so I posed this question to participants in the post experimental
questionnaire.
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Out of the 200 participants that I recruited, I exclude 18 individuals from my analysis
because they responded that they have less than one year of full-time work experience. There are
46 participants who indicated that they never had a performance evaluation meeting before.
However, the statistical inferences hold whether or not these participants are included in this
analysis. As a result, I kept these participants in my main sample and report robustness test
results using this question as a covariate.
4.2.5 Participant Compensation
Participants are paid a flat wage of £2.00 GBP to complete my study. This wage is set
based on Prolific minimum wage requirements. Prolific requires that researchers pay participants
a minimum wage of £6.00 GBP per hour. Based on the results of my prior pilot studies, I
estimate that the average completion time for the study is 20 minutes. This estimation led me to
set the wage at £2.00 GBP. To increase participants’ concentration levels while performing my
study, I placed two general knowledge bonus questions prior to the post experimental
questionnaire. I informed participants about this incentive at the beginning of the experiment to
boost their attentiveness. Participants have an opportunity to earn an extra £0.25 GBP if they
answered both questions correctly. A total of 174 participants answered both questions correctly.
There weren’t any participants that answered both questions incorrectly. 5 participants
incorrectly answered the question about the fifth month of the year, and 3 participants incorrectly
answered the 9 X 12 question. I included all these participants in my sample because no one
completely failed the attention check questions and provide robustness tests excluding these
participants.
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4.3 Independent Variables
4.3.1 Future Event Likelihood
I manipulate future event likelihood at two levels (low vs. high) similar to Bol et al.
(2015). Participants that are randomized into the future event likelihood low condition are
presented with the following information: “Economists feel that the likelihood of these events
reoccurring is extremely low (i.e., almost certain NOT to occur in future years).” Participants
that are randomized into the future event likelihood high condition are instructed: “Economists
feel that the likelihood of these events reoccurring is extremely high (i.e., almost certain to occur
in future years).” The full manipulation presented in the experiment is displayed in Appendix 2.
4.3.2 Compensation Interdependence
Participants are randomly assigned into a condition in which compensation
interdependence is either present or absent for their respective bonus. The manipulation occurs
on two separate screens. On the first screen it is manipulated verbally while on the second screen
it is manipulated graphically. Both numeric information and graphical information is presented
to participants about the differential between a fully adjusted bonus versus an unadjusted bonus
to ensure that they understand the magnitude of the ex-post discretionary adjustment.
Participants in the compensation interdependence absent condition are informed “employees’
bonuses are drawn from an individual bonus pool that is not shared between you (the Division X
manager) and the Division Y manager. This means that the two managers’ bonuses come from
two different independent pools.” Participants are also informed “Therefore, in situations where
your manager decides to make an adjustment to increase one employee’s bonus, it has no effect
on the other employee’s bonus.” On another screen, participants see a bar graph depicting their
bonus if they receive an adjustment versus if they do not. In the compensation interdependence
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absent condition participants see one bar with an unadjusted bonus of $4,000 and an adjusted
incentive of $5,410.
In contrast, participants in the compensation interdependence present condition are
advised: “employees’ bonuses are drawn from a joint bonus pool that is shared between you (the
Division X manager) and the Division Y manager. This means that the two managers’ bonus sum
to the total bonus pool amount based on the firm’s total profit.” In addition, participants read
“Therefore, in situations where your supervisor decides to make an adjustment to increase one
employee’s bonus, it will automatically decrease the other employee’s bonus. Graphically, the
participants in the compensation interdependence present condition, see one bar graph with the
initial bonus of $4,000 and another graph with the adjusted incentive type of $4,742. The
difference in the adjustment amounts is due to the compensation interdependence inherent in the
bonus pool. Refer to Appendix 2 for the exact manipulation used.
4.4 Dependent Variables
To test my hypotheses, I measure four dependent variables: 1) distributive justice scale,
3) adjustment expectation, 3) the employee’s expected effort level next year if no adjustment is
received and 4) the anticipated level of workplace deviance if no adjustment is received.
4.4.1 Distributive Justice Scale
To measure justice evaluations that the incentive compensation elicits, I collect selfreported measures of distributive justice based on Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted
distributive justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001).
Distributive justice measures the appropriateness of decision outcomes including equity, equality
and need (Adams 1965; Leventhal 1976; Colquitt 2001; Colquitt and Zipay 2015).
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Participants are asked to answer a four-item distributive justice scale regarding the bonus that
they received from their supervisor. This scale is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1
corresponds to “to a small extent” and 5 corresponds to “to a large extent”. The complete scale is
presented in Appendix 2.14
I perform an exploratory factor analysis using the principal components method to
determine whether distributive justice is a unidimensional scale. Table 1 Panel C evaluates the
results of the 4-item distributive justice scale, which yields a one factor solution with an
eigenvalue of 3.24. 81.05% of the variance is explained and the Cronbach’s α of the scale is
0.92. This analysis provides evidence that the scale used is unidimensional and I use the sum of
this scale to analyze my results.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
4.4.2 Adjustment Expectation
My theory suggests that participants’ reactions to their supervisor’s behavior is affected
by their adjustment expectations. As a result, in my instrument I ask my participants to respond
to the following statements: 1) I expect my manager to make an adjustment to increase my bonus
and 2) I believe my manager will make an adjustment to increase my bonus. A 7-point Likert
scale is used to measure their responses (1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and 7 corresponds
to “strongly agree”). I used this scale in prior pilot tests and based the scale on a survey that I

14

I specifically focus on distributive justice while keeping procedural justice constant across experimental
conditions and relatively high. Specifically, participants learn that the bonus is initially calculated based on the
division’s profit, but the supervisor has the ability to make adjustments as he sees fit. This piece of information is to
introduce participants to the fair procedures that are in place in their organization. Results from a pilot study in
which participants completed the procedural justice scale suggest no significant differences in procedural justice
evaluation between conditions.
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conducted about employees’ perceptions about bonuses, raises and ex-post discretionary
adjustments.15
I perform an exploratory factor analysis using the principal components method to
determine whether adjustment expectation is a unidimensional scale. Table 1 Panel B reports the
results for the 2-item adjustment expectation scale and presents a one factor solution with an
eigenvalue of 1.68, 84.00% of the variance is explained and the Cronbach’s α of the scale is
0.81. I use the sum of this scale to analyze my results.
4.4.3 Dependent Variable - Future Effort Level if No Adjustment is Made
To measure participants’ future effort next year, I ask participants the following question:
“please consider the following scenario as the manager of Division X. For each scenario, state
your desired effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision
your supervisor provides you with no bonus adjustment and your bonus remains at $4,000.”
Participants are asked to specify their effort next year on a 5-point Likert scale (where 1
corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as 2019” and 5
corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”. The screen presented to participants is
presented in Appendix 2.
4.4.4 Workplace Deviance Scale
To validate my dependent variables, I analyze my results using a modified version of the
Aquino, Lewis and Bradfield (1999) workplace deviance scale that measures the construct of
employees’ deviant behaviors aimed at the organization that they work for. I use all the items in
the scale except I change the labels used in the 5-point Likert scale to correspond to my

15

The pilot study was run on Prolific using the same filters as the main study and participants were compensated 2
GBP for their participation. 200 participants were used in the pilot and their demographic information is similar to
the participants in the main study.
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experiment. This construct was developed by Robinson and Bennett (1995) and is frequently
used in both psychology and organizational behavior research (Bennett and Robinson 2000). The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors
including intentionally arriving late to work and lying about the number of hours they work. To
ensure that this scale measured participants’ behavioral changes from 2019 to the next year
(2020) because of the bonus provided, I preamble the scale with the following instructions
“please recall that in 2019 you received a bonus of $4,000 and your supervisor did not adjust
your bonus for the uncontrollable event that your division experienced. Please consider each of
the behaviors on the scale below and state your intention to engage in this behavior in 2020.”
Participants provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to
“significantly less than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to
“significantly more than 2019”. The exact scale is shown in Appendix 2.16
I perform a confirmatory factor analysis to determine whether workplace deviance is a
unidimensional scale. The results are reported in Table 1. Table 1 Panel C reports the factor
analysis results for the workplace deviance scale. I discover a one factor solution in which
81.60% of the variance is explained and the lowest standardized factor loading for the item is
0.837. Cronbach’s α of the 9-item scale is 0.96. The model fit is acceptable. In particular, the
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 0.042, the Comprehensive Fit Index (CFI)
is 0.935, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is 0.922. This factor analysis confirms that the scale is
unidimensional, and I use the scale sum as my dependent variable.

16

Participants’ prior experience in real life may affect their judgements and decisions. However, demographic
questions about participants’ prior work experience was controlled and robustness tests were performed to ensure
prior experience did not influence the results.
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4.5 Other Measured Variables
4.5.1 Incentive Compensation Satisfaction Scale
Participants’ reactions to their supervisor’s adjustment decision may be affected by their
satisfaction with the bonus that they initially received. To measure participants’ satisfaction
levels with the incentive compensation awarded to them by their supervisor, I use a modified
version of the compensation satisfaction scale developed by Sturman and Short (2000).
Participants state their satisfaction levels based on a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to
“very dissatisfied and 5 corresponds to “very satisfied) to 3 different items. The entire scale is
shown in Appendix 2. Since this scale is highly correlated to the distributive justice scale, I
exclude reporting the scale results and from using it in my path analysis reported in Chapter 5.
4.5.2 Equity Sensitivity Scale
Prior research on equity theory specifies that there are individual differences in how
individuals evaluate the equity of a situation. The individual differences categorize people into
two categories: 1) benevolent (more relationship and giving oriented) and 2) high entitlement
(more outcome focused). To assess this construct, I ask participants to complete the King and
Miles (1994) equity sensitivity scale. This scale consists of 5 questions in which participants
need to allocate 10 points between themselves and the organization they work for. The scale, as
the participants saw it in the experiment, is presented in Appendix 2.
4.5.3 Competitiveness Scale
Prior studies have found that when individuals are required to share resources, an
individual sense of competitiveness may affect their behavior (Campbell and Furrer, 1995;
Banker, Lee, Potter, and Srinivasan, 1996). Since one of my independent variables is
compensation interdependence that manipulates whether their bonus is individual versus shared,
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I measure participants’ individual differences in their levels of competitiveness. I measure
individuals’ competitiveness levels using the Smither and Houston (1992) competitiveness
index. Based on Houston, Harris, McIntire, and Francis’ (2002) analysis, this index is divided
into two main factors (enjoyment of competition and conscientiousness). I presented participants
with the 14 items scale that they answer using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to
“strongly disagree” and 5 corresponds to “strongly agree”). The whole scale is presented in
Appendix 2.
4.5.4 Demographic Variables
I measure various demographic variables including their employment income, gender,
age, education level, whether they have a professional designation, years of work experience,
employment status and the effects of COVID 19 on their employment income. I measure the
effects of COVID 19 on my participants’ employment income because I collected data for this
experiment during the COVID 19 pandemic and wanted to ensure that this pandemic did not
affect their answers. I also ask participants specific questions regarding their past experience
with compensation and performance evaluations including: 1) whether they receive a bonus as
part of their compensation package, 2) if they have performance evaluation meetings with their
supervisors, 3) if they conduct performance evaluations and 4) if they have ever negotiated the
results of their performance evaluation.17

To control for difference in individuals’ perceptions of compensation importance, I create a 3-item compensation
importance scale. In this scale, I ask participants to report how important the size of their bonus is to them, how
important the size of Division Y manager’s bonus is to them and how important is the relative size of their bonus
compared to Division Y’s bonus. I measure their response on a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “very
unimportant” and 5 corresponds to “very important”). This scale yielded no significant results so I excluded it from
my reported results in Chapter 5.
17
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4.6 Summary
I employ a 2 X 2 between-participants design to test whether compensation
interdependence (present vs. absent) and future event likelihood (very high vs. very low) have an
effect on employees’ distributive justice evaluations, adjustment expectations, future effort and
workplace deviance levels in situations where their supervisor decides not to adjust their
performance bonus for the effects of an uncontrollable negative event. The next chapter presents
the results of my experiment.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
I report the results of my experiment in this chapter. This chapter begins with Section 5.2
which analyzes the participants’ demographic information and tests the effectiveness of
randomization. Section 5.3 describes the results of comprehension check questions. The
hypotheses testing is reported in Section 5.4. In particular, Section 5.4.1 examines how future
event likelihood and compensation interdependence affect distributive justice. Section 5.4.2
examines the effects of future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on adjustment
expectations. Next, Section 5.4.3 examines the effects of future event likelihood and
compensation interdependence on future effort. The final hypotheses studying the effects of
future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on workplace deviance are explored
in Section 5.4.4. Section 5.5 presents the results of the supplemental analysis and Section 5.6
describes the robustness checks that I perform. In Section 5.7, I test a boundary condition in
which the supervisor’s use of an ex-post discretionary adjustment impacts the employee’s raise
rather than bonus. This chapter concludes in Section 5.8.
5.2 Participant’s Demographic Information and Randomization Testing
I initially recruit 200 participants for this experiment. However, in formal tests of my
hypotheses, I exclude 18 participants for not having sufficient work experience.18 Participants’
demographic information by condition is presented in Table 2. Participants on average have 10
years of work experience and 51% of them are male. On average, participants fall into the
following age brackets: 45% of participants are between 18 – 29 years, 40% of participants are

18

A full analysis including the excluded participants is reported in Section 5.6. In the rest of this chapter, I report
results from the 182 participants.
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between 30 – 39 years, 11% of participants are between 40 – 49 years, and 4% of participants are
between 50 – 59 years. In terms of education, 21% of participants have a high school diploma,
4% of participants have an apprenticeship or trade, 16% of participants have a post- secondary
diploma, 42% of participants have a post- secondary degree, and 17% of participants have a
master’s degree or higher. The breakdown of participants’ employment status is as follows: 46%
work full time, 15% work part time, 11% self-employed, 1% business owners, 9% full time
students and 18% unemployed. In total, 36% of participants possess a professional designation,
46% of participants receive a bonus as part of their compensation, 75% of participants have had
a performance evaluation meeting with their supervisor, 29% of participants have conducted a
performance evaluation for an employee, and 21% of participants have negotiated the results of
their performance evaluation. Lastly, participants respond, on a 7-point Likert scale, to the
question of “To what extent has your employment income been affected by the COVID 19
pandemic? (1: “not affected”; 7: “very affected”). The mean (standard deviation) of the response
is 4.077 (2.321), which is not significantly different from the neutral point of 4 (t = 0.447, p =
0.655).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To test the effectiveness of randomization, I performed a cross tabulation analysis for the
abovementioned categorical variables. The results of the cross-tabulation analysis are reported
in Table 3. The results show that the randomization was successful for most variables as they do
not differ significantly between conditions (p > 0.192). The only variable that differs between
conditions is the response to the question of whether they have a meeting with their supervisor to
review their performance evaluations (χ2 (1) = 4.189 and p = 0.041).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
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For the continuous variables (i.e., work experience, education, and impact of COVID 19),
I perform analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test the effectiveness of randomization. Table 3
reports the results of the ANOVAs where I use the continuous variables as the dependent
variables and future event likelihood and compensation interdependence as the independent
variables. The result on work experience is reported in Table 4 Panel A and it does not differ
between experimental conditions (F < 1.138, p > 0.287). Table 4 Panel B reports the results on
education: the effect of future event likelihood is significant (F = 9.795, p = 0.002) but the effect
of compensation interdependence (F = 0.631, p = 0.428) and the interaction effect between
future event likelihood and compensation interdependence (F = 0.812, p = 0.369) are
insignificant. The result on ANOVA for the impact of COVID 19 is reported in Table 4 Panel C
and it does not differ between experimental conditions (F < 2.271, p > 0.134).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Since there are significant between-condition differences in education and performance
evaluation meeting, in Section 5.6.1, I perform robustness tests using these two variables as
covariates to examine whether my main results hold while controlling for the effects of these
differences.
5.3 Comprehension Check
Participants are required to complete comprehension check questions to ensure that they
understand the important details of the case prior to answering the questions that I used to
measure the dependent variables and mediators. If participants answer the question correctly on
the first try, they immediately proceed to the next question. However, if participants either
answer the question incorrectly or click “do not recall”, they are asked the question again and are
provided with a hint. Table 5 presents the percentage of participants, by condition, that answered
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each question correctly on their first try. On average, the highest correct response rate is 97%
(for the questions asking whether: 1) the negative event had a negative impact on the division’s
profit, 2) the negative event was outside of their control, and 3) the supervisor has the ability to
make adjustments to your bonus) while the lowest correct response rate is 87% (for the question
asking about the likelihood of a similar event reoccurring in the future, and the question asking if
the bonus comes from an individual or shared pool). There are 117 participants who answered
every comprehension check question correctly on their first try while 65 participants made at
least one error on the quiz. I perform robustness test in Section 5.6.3 using only responses from
the 117 participants to determine whether the results depend on the inclusion of participants who
may have struggled with the comprehension check questions.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
5.4 Hypotheses Testing
5.4.1 - Hypotheses 1a & 1b: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation
Interdependence on Distributive Justice Evaluations
As argued in Section 3.3, I theorize in H1a that when future event likelihood is high,
compensation interdependence will not affect employees’ distributive justice. Descriptive
statistics presented in Table 6 Panel A are fairly consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, in
the high future event likelihood conditions, the distributive justice mean (standard deviation) is
13.178 (5.047) when compensation interdependence is absent and is 11.370 (5.255) when
compensation interdependence is present. Both means are significantly higher than the scale
midpoint, compensation interdependence absent (t = 4.224, p < 0.001) and compensation
interdependence present (t = 1.768, p = 0.042).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
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I formally test H1a using ANOVA and follow-up simple effect tests. Panel B of the table
summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C displays the simple effects of compensation
interdependence by future event likelihood. Panel B shows a significant interaction between
future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on distributive justice (F = 6.244, p =
0.013)19. Unexpectedly, Panel C shows that when future event likelihood is high, the effect of
compensation interdependence on distributive justice is marginally significant (F = 2.801, p =
0.098). One possible explanation for these results may be that employees initially evaluate bonus
systems where compensation interdependence is present as lower in overall justice than bonus
systems in which compensation interdependence is absent, because of the zero-sum game
inherent in these systems. This may influence employees’ initial distributive justice evaluations
when they form their primary fairness heuristic.
In H1b, I hypothesize that in circumstances where future event likelihood is low,
employees’ distributive justice evaluations will be lower when compensation interdependence is
absent versus present. This hypothesis is consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in
Table 6 Panel A: when future event likelihood is low, distributive justice mean (standard
deviation) is lower when compensation interdependence is absent 9.818 (4.172) versus present
11.468 (4.075). The simple effects test shown in Table 6 Panel C provide support for H1b: when
future event likelihood is low, the effect of compensation interdependence on distributive justice
is significant (F = 3.641, p = 0.060). A graphical presentation of the results of H1a and H1b are
displayed in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]

19

All p-values reported are two tailed. The following statistical criteria were used to determine significance: (i) p >=
0.10 – approaching marginal significance, (ii) 0.10 < p < 0.05 –marginally significant and (iii) p < 0.05 significant.
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5.4.2 - Hypotheses 2a & 2b: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation
Interdependence on Adjustment Expectations
In the development of H2a, I predict that when future event likelihood is high,
compensation interdependence will not affect adjustment expectations. Descriptive statistics
presented in Table 7 Panel A are compatible with this hypothesis. In the high future event
likelihood conditions, the adjustment expectation mean (standard deviation) is comparable
whether compensation interdependence is absent 7.659 (2.957) or present 7.848 (3.340). I
formally test H2a using ANOVA and the follow-up simple effect tests. Panel B of the table
summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C displays the simple effects of compensation
interdependence by future event likelihood. Table 7 Panel B shows a significant interaction
between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on adjustment expectation (F
= 4.361, p = 0.038). The simple effects tests reported in Table 7 Panel C support H2a.
Specifically, when future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on
adjustment expectations is insignificant (F = 0.080, p = 0.778).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
On the other hand, I argue in H2b that when future event likelihood is low, employees
will have higher adjustment expectations when compensation interdependence is absent versus
present. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 7 coincide with this hypothesis. Notably, in the
low future event likelihood conditions, adjustment expectation mean (standard deviation) is
higher when compensation interdependence is absent 8.636 (2.730) than when it is present 6.936
(3.089). The simple effects test reported in Table 7 Panel C support this hypothesis. Specifically,
when future event likelihood is low, the effect of compensation interdependence on adjustment
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expectations is significant (F = 7.703, p = 0.007). A graphical presentation of the results of H2a
and H2b are displayed in Figure 5.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
To determine whether participants engaged in different attributions depending on future
event likelihood, I hired an independent coder who had no knowledge of the study and had them
code participant responses to the open-ended question that asked participants to write down the
issues that they would like to discuss with their manager during the performance evaluation
meeting. The coder coded responses as internal attributions, external attributions, mixed
attributions and no attributions. I perform cross tabulation analysis on the coded variable and
find a significant difference between participants’ responses when future event likelihood is low
versus high (χ2 (4) = 25.454 and p < 0.001, un-tabulated). I further test whether participants
engaged in different levels of social comparison based on future event likelihood by running an
ANOVA and follow up simple effect tests on participants’ responses to “how important is the
size of Division Y manager’s bonus to you”. The interaction between future event likelihood is
insignificant (F = 0.205, p = 0.652). Follow up simple effects test show that when future event
likelihood is low, the effect of compensation interdependence on the importance of the size of
Division Y manager’s bonus is marginally significant (F = 3.240, p = 0.075) but is insignificant
when future event likelihood is high (F =1.112, p = 0.294).
5.4.3 - Hypotheses 3a & 3b: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation
Interdependence on Effort
In the development of H3a, I assert that when future event likelihood is high,
compensation interdependence will not affect effort. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 8
Panel A are consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, when future event likelihood is high,
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effort mean (standard deviation) is similar whether compensation interdependence is absent
3.044 (1.167) or present 2.913 (1.244). I formally test H3a using ANOVA and the follow-up
simple effect tests. Panel B of the table summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C
displays the simple effects of compensation interdependence by future event likelihood. Panel B
shows a marginally significant interaction between future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence on effort (F = 2.795, p = 0.096). The simple effects test shown in Table 8 Panel
C provide support for H3a: when future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation
interdependence on effort is insignificant (F = 0.270, p = 0.605).
[Insert Table 8 about here]
I theorized that when future event likelihood is low, effort will be lower when
compensation interdependence is absent than when it is present. Notably, in the low future event
likelihood conditions, effort mean (standard deviation) is lower when compensation
interdependence is absent 2.74 (0.95) than when it is present 3.12 (1.06). Panel C shows that the
effect of compensation interdependence is significant when future event likelihood is low (F =
4.636, p = 0.034), supporting H3b. A graphical presentation of the results of H3a and H3b are
displayed in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
5.4.4 - Hypotheses 4a & 4b: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation
Interdependence on Workplace Deviance
In the development of H4a, I theorized that when future event likelihood is high,
compensation interdependence will have no effects on workplace deviance. This hypothesis is
consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 9 Panel A: when future event
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likelihood is high, workplace deviance mean (standard deviation) is similar whether
compensation interdependence is absent 20.067 (8.910) or present 22.804 (8.326).
[Insert Table 9 about here]
I formally test H4a using ANOVA and the follow-up simple effect tests. Panel B of the
table summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C displays the simple effects by future
event likelihood and compensation interdependence. Panel B shows a significant interaction
between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on workplace deviance (F =
8.133, p = 0.005). The simple effects test shown in Table 9 Panel C provide support for H4a:
when future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on workplace
deviance is insignificant (F=2.295, p=0.133).
In H4b, I hypothesize that in circumstances where future event likelihood is low,
workplace deviance will be higher when compensation interdependence is absent than when
compensation interdependence is present. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 9 Panel A are
consistent with this hypothesis. Particularly, in the low future event likelihood conditions,
workplace deviance mean (standard deviation) is higher when compensation interdependence is
absent 26.205 (7.099) than when it is present 21.830 (9.097). Panel C shows that the effect of
compensation interdependence is significant when future event likelihood is low (F = 6.480, p =
0.013), supporting H4b. A graphical presentation of the results of H4a and H4b are displayed in
Figure 7.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
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5.5 Supplemental Analysis: The Mediation Effects of Adjustment Expectations and
Distributive Justice
I conduct a multi-group path analysis to investigate further the potential mediation effects
of adjustment expectation and distributive justice. The results of the path analysis are shown in
Figure 8 and Table 10. I first divide participants into two groups by future event likelihood: high
(n =91) and low (n = 91). The error terms linked with adjustment expectation and distributive
justice are allowed to co-vary and the error terms associated with effort and workplace deviance
are allowed to co-vary. All path coefficients are first allowed to differ between the two groups.
The model fit statistics indicate that the data fits this fully unconstrained model well (Kline
2015). Specifically, the chi-square value of the model is insignificant (χ² (4) = 3.211 (p =
0.523)), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is < 0.001, the Comprehensive
Fit Index (CFI) is 1.000, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is 0.979, and the PCLOSE is insignificant
at 0.712.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
To determine whether the effects of compensation interdependence on the mediators differs
depending on future event likelihood, I evaluate the fully unconstrained model against a partially
constrained model where the effects of compensation interdependence on the two mediators are
constrained to be the same between groups. This partially constrained model (hereafter “first
constrained model”) yields a significantly worse fit: (χ² (6) = 12.101, p = 0.060, un-tabulated),
signifying that future event likelihood affects at least one of the two path coefficients. To
determine which path leads to the effects, I evaluate another partially constrained model
(hereafter “second constrained model”) where I only constrain the path between compensation
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interdependence and adjustment expectation (but not distributive justice) to be equal between
groups. This second constrained model yields a better fit (χ²(5) = 7.778, p = 0.169, un-tabulated)
than the first constrained model (Δχ²(1) = 4.323, p = 0.038, un-tabulated). Thus, the effect of
compensation interdependence on distributive justice differs significantly between high and low
future event likelihood conditions. To assess the difference in the paths between compensation
interdependence and adjustment expectation, I evaluate the difference between the second
constrained model and the fully unconstrained model. This difference is again significant
(Δχ²(1)=4.567, p = 0.033, un-tabulated) which signifies that effect of compensation
interdependence on adjustment expectation also differs between high and low future event
likelihood conditions.
As shown in Figure 8 and Table 10, the effects of compensation interdependence on the
mediators are only significant or marginally significant in the low future event likelihood
conditions: the coefficients between compensation interdependence and adjustment expectation
are significant (β = -0.282, SE = 0.622, p = 0.005), and compensation interdependence and
distributive justice are marginally significant (β =0.198, SE = 01.012, p = 0.055). In the high
future event likelihood conditions: the coefficients between compensation interdependence and
adjustment expectation are insignificant (β = 0.037, SE = 0.622, p = 0.724), and compensation
interdependence and distributive justice are marginally significant (β = 0.175, SE = 1.074, p =
0.092).
On the other hand, the effects of the mediators on the two dependent variables are either
significant or marginally significant in both the low and high future event likelihood conditions,
and they are similar in magnitude. Specifically, in the low future event likelihood conditions, the
coefficients between adjustment expectation and effort are significant (β = -0.289, SE = 0.026, p
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= 0.001) and adjustment expectation and workplace deviance are significant (β = 0.379, SE =
0.273, p < 0.001). In the high future event likelihood conditions, the coefficients between
adjustment expectation and effort are significant (β = -0.384, SE = 0.031, p < 0.001) and
adjustment expectation and workplace deviance are marginally significant (β = 0.171, SE =
0.267, p = 0.077). Similarly, in the low future event likelihood conditions, the coefficients
between distributive justice and effort are significant (β = 0.425, SE = 0.019, p < 0.001) and
distributive justice and workplace deviance are marginally significant (β = -0.183, SE = 0.198, p
= 0.062). In the high future event likelihood conditions, the coefficients between distributive
justice and effort are significant (β = 0.473, SE = 0.019, p < 0.001) and distributive justice and
workplace deviance are significant (β = -0.368, SE = 0.161, p < 0.001).
In summary, my results suggest that compensation interdependence influences both
adjustment expectation and distributive justice only when the future event likelihood is low and
not when future event likelihood is high. Regardless of future event likelihood however,
adjustment expectations and distributive justice affect both effort and workplace deviance.
5.6 Robustness Checks
5.6.1 Analysis of Potential Covariates
The chi-squared test reported in Table 3 shows a significant difference between
conditions in whether participants had meetings with their supervisors to discuss their
performance evaluation (hereafter performance evaluation meeting). Similarly, the ANOVA
results reported in Table 3 show a significant difference in education levels between conditions.
To control for the effects of these differences, I run ANCOVAs with the same independent and
dependent variables used for the hypothesis testing, but with education and performance
evaluation meeting as covariates. The results are reported in Table 11 Panel A for distributive
73

justice, Table 11 panel B for adjustment expectations, Table 11 Panel C for effort and Table 10
Panel D for workplace deviance. Analyzing the results of distributive justice as the dependent
variable, the interactive effect of future event likelihood and compensation interdependence is
significant (F = 4.128, p = 0.044).20 I use follow up simple effect tests to gain an understanding
of the interaction. When future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation
interdependence on distributive justice is insignificance (F = 2.484, p = 0.119, un-tabulated) but
when future event likelihood is low, this effect is marginally significant (F = 3.789, p = 0.055,
un-tabulated). The interactive effect of future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence is significant (F = 5.730, p = 0.0018) when using adjustment expectations as the
dependent variable.21 Follow up simple effect tests show that this effect of compensation
interdependence on adjustment expectations only occurs when future event likelihood is low (F =
7.309, p = 0.008, un-tabulated) but not when future event likelihood is high (F = 0.018, p =
0.893, un-tabulated).) For effort as the dependent variable, the interactive effect of future event
likelihood and compensation interdependence approaches marginal significance (F = 2.602, p =
0.109).22 Follow up simple effect test show that when future event likelihood is high, the effect of
compensation interdependence on effort is insignificant (F = 0.135, p = 0.714, un-tabulated) but
when future event likelihood is low, this effect is significant (F = 4.612, p = 0.035, un-tabulated).
Looking at workplace deviance as the dependent variable, the interactive effect of future event

20

The results for distributive justice as the dependent variable show the main effect of future event likelihood is
insignificant (F = 0.031 p = 0.861), the main effect of compensation interdependence is marginally significant (F =
3.018, p = 0.084).
21
The results for adjustment expectations as the dependent variable show the main effect of future event likelihood is
significant (F = 6.629, p = 0.011), the main effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.001, p =
0.973.
22
For effort as the dependent variable, the main effect of future event likelihood is insignificant (F = 1.693, p =
0.195) and the main effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.828, p = 0.364).
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likelihood and compensation interdependence is significant (F = 7.462, p = 0.007).23 Follow up
simple effect tests show that when future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation
interdependence on workplace deviance is insignificant (F = 1.512, p =0.222, un-tabulated) but
when future event likelihood is low this effect is significant (F = 6.198, p = 0.015, un-tabulated)
Therefore, relationships reported during hypothesis testing are directionally similar with the
inclusion of the covariates.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Theory suggests that a person’s sense of competitiveness which consists of their
enjoyment of competition and conscientiousness, as well as equity sensitivity, may affect the
relationships that I am testing. To ensure that these variables do not affect my results, I run
ANCOVAs with the same independent and dependent variables as in the main analyses, and
enjoyment of competition, conscientiousness, and equity sensitivity as covariates. The results of
this analysis are reported in Table 12 Panel A for distributive justice, Table 12 Panel B for
adjustment expectations, Table 12 Panel C for effort and Table 12 Panel D for workplace
deviance.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
As displayed in Table 12 Panel A, the effects of the covariates on distributive justice are
insignificant (F < 2.034, p > 0.156), the main effect of future event likelihood is significant (F =
5.659, p = 0.018), the main effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.149, p
= 0.700) and the interaction between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence
is significant (F = 7.3620, p =0.007).24 Follow up simple effect tests show that when future event

23

For workplace deviance as the dependent variable, the main effect of future event likelihood is significant (F =
5.949, p = 0.016) and the main effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.587, p = 0.445).
24
For distributive justice as the dependent variable, main effect of future event likelihood is significant (F = 5.659, p
= 0.018), and the main effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.149, p = 0.700).
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likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on distributive justice is
significant (F = 4.283, p = 0.042, un-tabulated) and when future event likelihood is low, this
effect is marginally significant (F = 2.835 , p = 0.096, un-tabulated). As shown in Table 12
Panel B, the effects of the covariates on adjustment expectations are insignificant (F < 0.331, p >
0.566), and the interaction between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence is
significant (F = 3.917, p =0.049).25 The simple effect tests show that when future event
likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on adjustment expectations is
insignificant (F = 0.005, p = 0.945, un-tabulated) and when future event likelihood is low, this
effect is significant (F = 7.183, p = 0.009, un-tabulated). Next, as revealed in Table 12 Panel C,
the effects of the covariates on effort are insignificant (F < 1.495, p > 0.223) and the interaction
between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence is marginally significant (F =
3.042, p =0.083).26 Follow up simple effect tests show that when future event likelihood is high,
the effect of compensation interdependence on effort is insignificant (F = 0.373, p = 0.543, untabulated) and when future event likelihood is low, this effect is significant (F = 4.869, p = 0.030,
un-tabulated). Lastly, as presented Table 12 Panel D, although equity sensitivity is a significant
covariate for workplace deviance (F = 14.010, p < 0.001), the interactive effect of future event
likelihood and compensation interdependence on workplace deviance remains significant
(F = 6.820, p = 0.010).27 I use simple effect tests to determine the nature of the interactive effect
when future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on workplace
deviance is marginally significant (F = 2.819, p = 0.097) and when future event likelihood is low.

25

For adjustment expectations, the main effect of future event likelihood is insignificant (F = 0.000, p = 0.994), and
the main effect of compensation interdependence is approaching significance (F = 2.668, p = 0.104).
26
For effort as the dependent variable, the main effect of future event likelihood is insignificant (F = 1.669, p =
0.198), and the main effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.387, p = 0.535).
27
For workplace deviance as the dependent variable, the main effect of future event likelihood is significant (F =
5.447, p = 0.021), and the main effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.021, p = 0.886).
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This effect is marginally significant (F = 3.691, p = 0.058). Therefore, my main results reported
in Table 5 to Table 8 are not fully driven by individual differences in competitiveness and equity
sensitivity.
5.6.2 Hypothesis Testing Including All Participants
I excluded 18 participants from my main analysis because they had less than one year of
work experience. To test the robustness of my results, I run ANOVA tests using future event
likelihood and compensation interdependence as my independent variables and effort or
workplace deviance as my dependent variance using all 200 participants. The interaction
between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence remains significant (F =
3.959, p = 0.048, un-tabulated) for effort.28 The simple effects test shows that when future event
likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on effort is insignificant (F =
0.364, p = 0.548, un-tabulated). In contrast, when future event likelihood is low, the effect of
compensation interdependence on effort is significant (F = 6.307, p = 0.014). For the dependent
variable workplace deviance, the interaction between future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence is significant (F = 9.451, p = 0.002, un-tabulated)29. To test the nature of the
interaction, the simple effects tests show that when future event likelihood is high, the effect of
compensation interdependence on workplace deviance is marginally significant (F = 6.307, p =
0.060, un-tabulated) and this effect is significant when future event likelihood is low (F = 6.021,
p = 0.016, un-tabulated) Thus, the reported main results do not depend on the exclusion of
participants with less work experience.

28

For effort as the dependent variable, the effect of future event likelihood is insignificant (F = 2.485, p = 0.117, untabulated), the effect of compensation interdependence is also insignificant (F = 1.073, p = 0.302, un-tabulated).
29
For the dependent variable, workplace deviance, the effect of future event likelihood is significant (F = 4.698, p =
0.031, un-tabulated), the effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.133, p = 0.715, untabulated).
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5.6.3 Hypothesis Testing Using Participants Who Answered the Comprehension Quiz
Perfectly
As reported in Section 5.3, out of the 182 participants that I used in my main analysis,
117 participants correctly answered all the comprehension quiz questions on their first try while
65 participants made at least one error. One may suspect that those 65 participants did not have a
great understanding of the experimental materials. To confirm that these participants’ responses
do not affect my results, I run ANOVA tests excluding the 65 participants. When I use effort as
the dependent variable, the interaction between future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence is marginally significant (F = 3.639, p = 0.059, un-tabulated).30 To test the
nature of the interaction, I use simple effect tests and find that when future event likelihood is
high, the effect of compensation interdependence on effort is insignificant (F = 0.085, p = 0.772,
un-tabulated). In contrast when future event likelihood is low, the effect of compensation
interdependence on effort is significant (F = 8.099, p = 0.006, un-tabulated).When I use
workplace deviance as the dependent variable, the interaction between future event likelihood
and compensation interdependence is significant (F = 5.959, p = 0.016, un-tabulated).31 I also
use simple effects test to test the nature of the interaction and find that when future event
likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on workplace deviance is
insignificant (F = 2.240, p = 0.140, un-tabulated) but when future event likelihood is low this
effect is marginally significant (F = 3.834, p = 0.055, un-tabulated). These results are consistent
with the results reported in my main analysis.

30

When I use effort as my dependent variable, the effect of future event likelihood is significant (F = 4.978, p =
0.028, un-tabulated), the effect compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 2.057, p = 0.154, un-tabulated).
31
When I use workplace deviance as my dependent variable, the effect of future event likelihood is insignificant (F
= 1.163, p = 0.283, un-tabulated), the effect compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.100, p = 0.753,
un-tabulated).
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As reported in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.5, participants were provided with attention check
questions before they answered the final demographic questions to ensure that they were still
fully engaged in the experiment. As reported in Section 4.2.5, 179 participants answered all the
questions correctly while 8 participants answered one of the questions incorrectly. In the analysis
reported above, all the participants were used. To confirm that the inclusion of the participants
that answered one attention check question incorrectly did not affect my result, I run ANOVA
tests excluding these participants. When I use effort as the dependent variable, the interaction
between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence is marginally significant (F =
2.881, p = 0.091, un-tabulated).32 To test the nature of the interaction, I use simple effect tests
and find that when future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on
effort is insignificant (F = 0.188, p = 0.666, un-tabulated). In contrast, when future event
likelihood is low, the effect of compensation interdependence on effort is significant (F = 5.603,
p = 0.020, un-tabulated).When I use workplace deviance as the dependent variable, the
interaction between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence is significant (F =
7.880, p = 0.006, un-tabulated).33 I also use simple effects test to test the nature of the interaction
and find that when future event likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence on
workplace deviance is insignificant (F = 2.177, p = 0.144, un-tabulated) but when future event
likelihood is low this effect is significant (F = 6.366, p = 0.014, un-tabulated). These results are
consistent with the results reported in my main analysis.

32

When I use effort as my dependent variable, the effect of future event likelihood is significant (F = 4.978, p =
0.028, un-tabulated), the effect compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 2.057, p = 0.154, un-tabulated).
33
When I use workplace deviance as my dependent variable, the effect of future event likelihood is insignificant (F
= 1.163, p = 0.283, un-tabulated), the effect compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 0.100, p = 0.753,
un-tabulated).
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5.7 Test of a Boundary Condition – Performance Evaluations for Raises
The results of performance evaluations not only affect employees’ performance bonuses
but also their salary increases or raises based on merit (Schaubroeck, Shaw, Duffy, and Mitra
2008). A raise is different from a bonus in that it increases the employee’s base pay and the
subsequent payments that they will receive during regular payroll. In contrast, a bonus is
provided to employees as a one-time payment and can be perceived as a windfall. This difference
between bonus and raise could alter the impact that future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence have on employees’ subsequent effort and workplace deviance. As a result, I
run a supplemental study with four additional experimental conditions to determine whether my
results hold when the supervisor has the discretion to adjust employees’ raise amounts, rather
than their bonus amounts. The experimental materials used in these four conditions is the same
as the one discussed in Chapter 4 except participants are informed that their division’s profit will
affect the salary raise that they will receive.
I initially recruit 203 participants for these 4 additional conditions. However, I exclude 14
participants for not having at least one year of work experience.34 Participants on average have
11 years of work experience and 53% of them are male. On average, participants fall into the
following age brackets: 46% of participants are between 18 – 29 years, 12% of participants are
between 30 – 39 years, 8% of participants are between 40 – 49 years, 8% of participants are
between 50 – 59 years and 4% of participants are 60 years and older. In terms of education, 24%
of participants have a high school diploma, 5% of participants have an apprenticeship or trade,
10% of participants have a post-secondary diploma, 44% of participants have a post-secondary

34

In the rest of this chapter, I report results from the 189 participants.
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degree, and 17% of participants have a master’s degree or higher. The breakdown of
participants’ employment status is as follows: 50% work full time, 12% work part time, 8% self
employed, 2% business owners, 6% full time students and 22% unemployed. In total, 33% of
participants possess a professional designation, 46% of participants receive a bonus as part of
their compensation, 75% of participants have had a performance evaluation meeting with their
supervisor, 34% of participants have conducted a performance evaluation for an employee, and
25% of participants have negotiated the results of their performance evaluation. Lastly,
participants respond, on a 7-point Likert scale, to the question of “To what extent has your
employment income been affected by the COVID 19 pandemic? (1: “not affected”; 7: “very
affected”). The mean (standard deviation) of the response is 4.122 (2.346), which is not
significantly different from the neutral point of 4 (t = 0.713, p = 0.477). The demographic results
are un-tabulated. Overall, the demographics of these participants are comparable to those in the
main study.
I performed the same randomization tests as I reported in Section 5.2. Randomization
was successful for the categorical demographic variables in that there were no significant
differences across conditions (p > 0.100, un-tabulated). Similarly, the randomization was
successful for all the continuous variables (F < 0.078, p > 0.388, un-tabulated).
To determine whether the results from the main study hold in the supplemental study
where the supervisor’s use of a discretionary adjustment affects their raises, I perform ANOVA
and simple effects tests using future event likelihood and compensation interdependence as the
independent variables and distributive justice, adjustment expectations, effort, and workplace
deviance as the dependent variables. The results on distributive justice are reported in Table 13,
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those on adjustment expectation are reported in Table 14, results on effort are reported in Table
15 and those on workplace deviance are reported in Table 16.
[Insert Table 13 about here]
[Insert Table 14 about here]
[Insert Table 15 about here]
[Insert Table 16 about here]
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 13 Panel A are opposite of those presented for
the bonus condition. In particular, in the high future event likelihood conditions, distributive
justice mean (standard deviation) is lower when compensation interdependence is present 11.077
(4.719) than when it is absent 13.000 (4.675). When future event likelihood is low, distributive
justice mean (standard deviation) is comparable whether compensation interdependence is
present 12.156 (4.805) or 12.380 (5.075).
I formally test the supplemental conditions using ANOVA and the follow-up simple
effect tests. Table 13 Panel B summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C displays the
simple effects of compensation interdependence by future event likelihood. There is an
insignificant interaction between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on
distributive justice (F = 1.453, p = 0.230). Table 13 Panel C shows that when future event
likelihood is high, the effect of compensation interdependence is marginally significant (F =
3.891, p = 0.052). In contrast, the effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant when
future event likelihood is low (F = 0.049, p = 0.826). These results are opposite to those reported
in the main study.
Exploring adjustment expectations, descriptive statistics presented in Table 14 Panel A
are different from those presented in Section 5.4.2. Specifically, in the high future event
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likelihood conditions, adjustment expectations mean (standard deviation) is similar whether
compensation interdependence is absent 8.400 (3.010) or present 7.622 (3.077). In the low future
event likelihood conditions, adjustment expectations mean (standard deviation) is also similar
when compensation interdependence is absent 7.024 (2.917) or when it is present 7.750 (3.086).
The ANOVA and the follow-up simple effect tests provide further evidence of the
difference between the results of the supplemental study and the main study. Table 14 Panel B
summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C displays the simple effects by future event
likelihood and compensation interdependence. The interaction between future event likelihood
and compensation interdependence on adjustment expectations is marginally significant (F =
2.895, p = 0.091). Panel C shows that the effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant
both when future event likelihood is high (F = 1.350, p = 0.248) and low (F = 1.548, p = 0.217).
Therefore, the effects of future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on
adjustment expectations are not observed in the supplemental study.
Descriptive statistics for effort presented in Table 15 Panel A are similar to those
presented for the bonus condition. When future event likelihood is high, effort mean (standard
deviation) is higher whether compensation interdependence is absent 3.000 (0.988) than present
2.692 (1.130). In the low future event likelihood conditions, effort mean (standard deviation) is
lower when compensation interdependence is absent 2.880 (1.023) than when it is present 3.267
(1.214).
I formally test the supplemental conditions using ANOVA and the follow-up simple
effect tests. Table 15 Panel B summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C displays the
simple effects of compensation interdependence by future event likelihood. There is a significant
interaction between future event likelihood and compensation interdependence on effort (F =
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4.730, p = 0.031). Table 15 Panel C shows that when future event likelihood is high, the effect of
compensation interdependence is insignificant (F = 1.926, p = 0.169). Athwart the effect of
compensation interdependence is marginally significant when future event likelihood is low (F =
2.837, p = 0.095). These results are consistent with those reported in the main study.
Regarding workplace deviance, descriptive statistics presented in Table 16 Panel A are
different from those presented in Section 5.4.4. In particular, in the high future event likelihood
conditions, workplace mean (standard deviation) is similar whether compensation
interdependence is absent 21.381 (9.120) or present 22.269 (9.450). In the low future event
likelihood conditions, workplace deviance mean (standard deviation) is similar when
compensation interdependence is absent 21.120 (8.731) or when it is present 20.267 (8.398).
The ANOVA and the follow-up simple effect tests provide further evidence. Table 16
Panel B summarizes the results of the ANOVA and Panel C displays the simple effects by future
event likelihood and compensation interdependence. The interaction between future event
likelihood and compensation interdependence on workplace deviance is insignificant (F = 0.445,
p = 0.506). Panel C shows that the effect of compensation interdependence is insignificant both
when future event likelihood is low (F = 0.235, p = 0.629) and when future event likelihood is
high (F = 0.212, p = 0.646). Therefore, the effects of future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence on workplace deviance are not observed when the ex-discretionary adjustment
can be used to increase raise amounts.
Corresponding to what I reported in Section 5.5, I conduct a multi-group path analysis to
investigate further the potential mediation effects of adjustment expectation and distributive
justice. The results of the path analysis are shown in Figure 9 and Table 17. I first divide
participants into two groups by future event likelihood: high (n =95) and low (n = 94). The error
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terms linked with adjustment expectation and distributive justice are allowed to co-vary and the
error terms associated with effort and workplace deviance are allowed to co-vary. All path
coefficients are allowed to vary between the groups. The model fit statistics indicate that the data
fits this fully unconstrained model well (Kline 2015). Specifically, the chi-square value of the
model is insignificant (χ² (4) = 2.321 (p = 0.677)), the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) is < 0.001, the Comprehensive Fit Index (CFI) is 1.000, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is
0.981, and the PCLOSE is insignificant at 0.826.
[Insert Table 17 about here]
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
As shown in Figure 9 and Table 17, the effects of compensation interdependence on the
mediators are not significant in the low future event likelihood conditions: the coefficients
between compensation interdependence and adjustment expectation (β = -0.128, SE = 0.622, p =
0.211) and compensation interdependence and distributive justice (β =-0.023, SE = 1.012, p =
0.824). This is in direct contrast to the main study in which the mediators were significant in the
low future event likelihood conditions. In the high future event likelihood conditions, the
coefficients are not significant between compensation interdependence and adjustment
expectation (β = 0.120, SE = 0.622, p = 0.243) but are significant between compensation
interdependence and distributive justice (β = -0.201, SE = 0.970, p = 0.047). However, in the
results of the main study the effects of the compensation interdependence on the mediators are
not significant in the high future event likelihood conditions.
Similar to the main study, the effects of the adjustment expectation on the two dependent
variables are significant and similar in magnitude in both the low and high future event
likelihood conditions. Specifically, in the low future event likelihood conditions, the coefficients
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between adjustment expectation and effort are (β = -0.441, SE = 0.034, p < 0.001) and
adjustment expectation and workplace deviance are (β = 0.445, SE = 0.256, p < 0.001). While in
the high future event likelihood conditions, the coefficients between adjustment expectation and
effort are (β = -0.332, SE = 0.033, p < 0.001) and adjustment expectation and workplace
deviance are (β = 0.236, SE = 0.311, p = 0.020). However, the effects of distributive justice on
the two dependent variables are different from the main study. The coefficients are insignificant
in the low future event likelihood conditions, the coefficients between distributive justice and
effort are (β = 0.112, SE = 0.021, p = 0.224) and distributive justice and workplace deviance are
(β = -0.136, SE = 0.159, p = 0.137). Whereas, in the high future event likelihood conditions, the
coefficients between distributive justice and effort are significant (β = 0.314, SE = 0.021, p <
0.001) but the coefficients between distributive justice and workplace deviance are insignificant
(β = -0.105, SE = 0.197, p = 0.299). Therefore, all the coefficients between distributive justice
and the two dependent variables differ between the supplemental study and the main study
except the coefficients between distributive justice and effort in the high future event likelihood
conditions.
In summary, my results suggest that compensation interdependence influences
distributive justice only when the future event likelihood is high and in turn distributive justice
affects effort but not workplace deviance. The relationships depicted in this model are different
from the relationships presented in the main study. One possible explanation for these findings
may be that since raises increase employees’ base pay, the lack of an ex-post discretionary
adjustment has greater long-term consequences on employees’ cumulative pay. This loss of both
current and future compensation may lead employees to lower their distributive justice
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evaluations and become more willing to decrease their effort when future event likelihood is
high.
5.8 Summary
This chapter provides the results observed in the evaluation of four hypotheses. I
demonstrate that compensation interdependence affects distributive justice, adjustment
expectations, effort, and workplace deviance only when the future event likelihood is low, not
when it is high. Specifically, when future event likelihood is low, effort will decrease while
workplace deviance will increase when compensation interdependence is absent versus present.
Results of the path analysis suggest that this occurs because participants have higher adjustment
expectations and lower distributive justice evaluations when future event likelihood is low and
compensation interdependence is absent. However, these effects do not occur when future event
likelihood is high. I also establish that the interactive effects of future event likelihood and
compensation interdependence on effort and workplace deviance only occur when the incentive
affected by the discretionary adjustment is a bonus, but not a raise.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
This chapter begins with a discussion of my hypotheses’ tests in Section 6.2. In Section
6.3, I discuss the contributions and practical implications made by my study. In Section 6.4, a
summary of my study’s limitations is considered, and future research opportunities are presented.
Lastly, I conclude my dissertation in Section 6.5.
6.2 Discussion of Hypotheses Testing
In my dissertation, I investigate a setting in which employees learn that their supervisors
did not provide them with ex-post discretionary adjustments for unforeseeable and negative
events that they encountered during the contracting period. Within this setting, I examine
whether compensation interdependence will influence employees’ distributive justice
evaluations, adjustment expectations, future effort, and workplace deviance, depending on
whether future event likelihood is high (i.e., the event is almost certain to reoccur) or low (i.e.,
the event is almost certain not to reoccur). My results suggest that compensation interdependence
influences employees’ reactions, only when future event likelihood is low but not when future
event likelihood is high.
In my main study, I examine situations where the ex-post discretionary adjustments, if
made, neutralize the effects of a negative unforeseeable event on employees’ bonuses. I evaluate
employees’ reactions under different levels of compensation interdependence (i.e., whether the
ex-post discretionary adjustment for the focal employee affects the compensation of their coworkers) and when future event likelihood is high and when future event likelihood is low. I
provide evidence to suggest that employees’ reactions (i.e., distributive justice evaluation,
adjustment expectations, future effort, and workplace deviance) will be more negative when
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compensation interdependence is absent versus present, but only when future event likelihood is
low and not when it is high. Specifically, when future event likelihood is high, compensation
interdependence has no effect on employees’ reactions (Hypothesis 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a), whereas
when future event likelihood is low, employees will have more negative reactions to not
receiving ex-post discretionary adjustments when compensation interdependence is absent than
when it is present (Hypothesis 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b).
In a supplementary path analysis, I explore why compensation interdependence
influences employees’ reactions to their supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustments
differently depending on whether the future event likelihood is high or low. When future event
likelihood is low, the relationship between compensation interdependence and employees’ future
effort and workplace deviance is mediated by employees’ distributive justice evaluations and
adjustment expectations. In contrast, when future event likelihood is high, I find that
compensation interdependence has a marginal effect on employees’ distributive justice
evaluations and no effects on their adjustment expectations, though the effects of distributive
justice evaluations and adjustment expectations have significant effects on employees’ future
effort and workplace deviance. Therefore, I find that employees have higher adjustment
expectations and lower distributive justice evaluations when compensation interdependence is
absent (vs. present) but only when future event likelihood is low (vs. high). This likely occurs
because when future likelihood is low, the future event is more distinct and pronounced which
leads employees to re-evaluate their fairness heuristic and integrate new information into their
distributive justice evaluations. These perceptions in turn affect employees’ behaviors and lead
to reductions in employees’ future effort and increases in employees’ workplace deviance.
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In a supplemental study, I examine situations where the employees’ supervisors fail to
adjust their raises (rather than bonuses) for the unforeseeable, negative events. Again, I explore
how compensation interdependence influences employees’ reactions to their supervisors’ ex-post
discretionary adjustments differently when future event likelihood of the event is high and when
it is low. My results are different from those reported in my main study. Specifically, I find that
if the reward in question is a raise, compensation interdependence does not affect employees’
reactions to not receiving ex-post discretionary adjustments when future event likelihood is low.
However, I find that compensation interdependence affects employees’ distributive justice
evaluations which in turn affect their future effort when future event likelihood is high. Taken
together, my results suggest that employees react to their supervisors’ ex-post discretionary
adjustment decisions differently depending on the reward type the adjustments will affect
(bonuses vs. raises). One potential reason for these differences may be that employees are more
cognizant of justice information when future event likelihood is high and compensation
interdependence is present (versus absent) when considering ex-post discretionary adjustments
for raises (vs. bonuses) because they know that the negative event will have a negative impact on
all their future payments versus those received by their co-worker.
6.3 Contributions
Both accounting researchers and practitioners can benefit from the contributions made by
my dissertation. Existing research suggests that ex-post discretionary adjustments benefit
organizations by filtering out the noise arising from unforeseeable events. By eliminating this
noise, it is argued that ex-post discretionary adjustments reduce employees’ compensation risk,
decrease perceived unfairness, and increase the effectiveness of incentives (Holmstrom 1979;
Banker and Datar 1989; Bol 2008). Yet prior research also finds that frequently, supervisors
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either do not fully utilize these adjustments or completely abstain from making them (Bol 2008;
Hoppe and Moers 2011; Bol, Hecht, and Smith 2015). My study extends the growing literature
on employees’ reactions to their supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions (Gibbs
et al. 2004; Arnold and Artz 2015; Kelly et al. 2015; Burt et al. 2019; Wong 2019). Different
from prior research, my study examines a setting where ex-post discretionary adjustments are
always part of the compensation contract, and employees are aware of their availability. Second,
my research examines variables (future event likelihood and compensation interdependence) that
Bol et al. (2015) find influence supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions
differently. By studying this setting from the employees’ perspective, my study showcases the
behavioral consequences that supervisors expose their organizations to if they decided not to
utilize the ex-post discretionary adjustments that are part of their compensation contract to
neutralize the effects of unforeseeable, negative events.
My research also benefits practitioners by showing that the mere availability (without the
use) of ex-post discretionary adjustments in the compensation contract influences both
employees’ perceptions and work behaviors. This is important for managers to be aware of
because Höppe and Moers (2011) find that only 24% of employers use ex-post discretionary
adjustments that have them available within their compensation contracts. These managers need
to be cognizant that their decisions not to adjust their employees’ bonuses may lead to negative
consequences for their employers.
6.4 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
The limitations inherent in my research provide fertile ground for future research. First,
although my study argues that the effects of future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence are driven by employees’ justice evaluations and attributions, my experiment
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does not provide direct evidence to support such predictions. Future research can be designed to
better capture the underlying psychological mechanisms behind the observed effects. For
example, a qualitative or survey based study can utilize more open ended questions to provide a
deeper understanding of employees’ thoughts and rationale for their decisions.
Second, my results may be sensitive to the employee’s relative performance. In my study,
I examine a setting in which the unforeseeable negative event causes the employee’s sales to be
less than their co-worker’s. However, there are situations in which the employee who
experiences the negative event may still achieve greater performance than their co-workers, a
setting studied by Bol et al. (2015). It is likely that the employees’ initial performance acts like
an anchor that influences how the employees react to their supervisors’ ex-post discretionary
adjustment decisions. Consequently, future research may explore whether my results generalize
to a setting where the employee encountering the unforeseeable, negative event outperforms their
co-workers.
Third, my results only explore future event likelihood from two extremes; the
unforeseeable negative event is almost certain to reoccur or almost certain not to reoccur.
However, in many circumstances, employees are unaware of the likelihood that an unexpected
event will reoccur. There may be a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the
reoccurrence of future events and prior studies find that employees respond to uncertainty
differently than certainty (Kahneman, Slovic, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Tiedens and Linton
2001). As a result, it is important for future research to examine whether event predictability
affects employees’ reactions to their supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions.
Fourth, in my study I examine how employees’ reactions to their supervisors’ ex-post
discretionary adjustment decisions differ when the adjustment affects their bonuses versus their
92

raises. In my setting, I find that employees react to raises differently than bonuses in that there
are no strong effects of compensation interdependence and/or future event likelihood on
employees’ reactions. Therefore, there is an opportunity for future research to examine the
reasons for this difference.
Fifth, I used a case based decision-making experiment to test my findings which makes it
difficult to deduce whether participants truly believed the case materials presented. This
literature stream can be advanced by running a real effort experiment, possibly including triads
of participants (i.e., supervisor, employee impacted by an unforeseeable negative event and the
co-worker). Exploring the same research questions from multiple perspectives simultaneously in
a real-effort experiment can shed light on the group dynamics between the supervisor and each
of the employees as well as the dynamics between the employees.
Lastly, in my experiment I explore an ambiguous negative event and do not describe
what has transpired to decrease Division X’s profitability. On the one hand, this design choice
broadens the generalizability of my findings to multiple scenarios. On the other hand, this
design choice may hinder my results as research participants may have difficulties imagining a
negative event that has a different event likelihood. Therefore, future research may explore the
effects that specific different scenarios have on participants’ reactions to their supervisors’
discretionary adjustment decisions. For example, a study can examine the differential effects of
a crisis like COVID-19 versus the emergence of a new competitors that utilizes a high-low
selling strategies which leads them to slash their prices every few years.
6.5 Conclusions
My dissertation examines the effects that future event likelihood and compensation
interdependence have on employees’ perceptions (distributive justice evaluations and adjustment
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expectations) and work behaviors (future effort and workplace deviance). Using a between
subject case experiment, I find that employees’ distributive justice evaluations and future effort
are lower when compensation interdependence is absent (vs. present) only when future event
likelihood is low but not when it is high. Similarly, I find that employees’ adjustment
expectations and workplace deviance behaviors are higher when compensation interdependence
is absent (vs. present) but only when future event likelihood is low. These results suggest that
employees react to their supervisors’ ex-post discretionary adjustment decisions and these
reactions are influenced by many factors including compensation interdependence and future
event likelihood.
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Figure 1:The Effect of Compensation Interdependence1 and Future Event Likelihood2 on
Future Effort3– Hypothesis 3a and 3b

Future Effort

3b

3a

Future Event Likelihood High

Future Event Likelihood Low

Interdependence Absent

Interdependence Present

1

Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool
2
.Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired
effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate
this dependent variable is “…your supervisor provides you with no raise(bonus)”. Participants respond using a 5point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as
2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”).
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Figure 2:The Effect of Compensation Interdependence1 and Future Event Likelihood2 on
Workplace Deviance3 – Hypothesis 4a and 4b

Workplace Deviance

4b

4a

Interdependence Absent

Interdependence Present

Future Event Likelihood High

Future Event Likelihood Low

1

Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual
items is used to measure workplace deviance.
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Figure 3 – Experimental Design Summary

Overview of firm background and participant's role

Experimental manipulations (compensation interdependence,
future event likelihood)

Bar graphs displaying raise/bonus received with or without
adjustment

Compensation check quiz

Adjustment expectaion scale

Presented 2019 bonus/raise without an adjustment and
adjustment request questions

Distributive justice and compensation satisfaction scale

Future effort and workplace deviance scales

Post experimental questionnaire including competiveness scale,
equity sensitivity scale and demographic questions
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Figure 4: The Effect of Future Event Likelihood1 and Compensation Interdependence2 on
Distributive Justice3
14
13.18

Distributive Justice

13

12
11.47
11

11.37

10
9.82
9

8

Compensation Interdependence Absent
Low Likelihood

1

Compensation Interdependence Present
High Likelihood

Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
2
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
3
Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive
justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001). The scale sum is used as the
measure of distributive justice.
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Figure 5: The Effect of Future Event Likelihood1 and Compensation Interdependence2 on
Adjustment Expectations3
9

Adjustment Expectations

8.5

8.64

8
7.85
7.5

7.66

7

6.94
6.5

6
Compensation Interdependence Absent Compensation Interdependence Present
Low Likelihood

High Likelihood

1

Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
2
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
3
The adjustment expectations scale is created to determine participant’s expectations about their supervisor’s
willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their bonus to adjust for the unexpected negative event.
Participants provide their answers to two items using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly
disagree” and 7 corresponds to “strongly agree”. The scale sum is used as the measure of adjustment expectation.
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Figure 6: The Effect of Future Event Likelihood1 and Compensation Interdependence2 on
Future Effort3
3.6
3.4
3.2

3.04

2.98

Future Effort

3

2.91
2.8
2.6

2.59

2.4
2.2
2

Compensation Interdependence Absent Compensation Interdependence Present

Low Likelihood

High Likelihood

1

Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
2
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
3
Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired
effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate
this dependent variable is “…your supervisor provides you with no raise(bonus)”. Participants respond using a 5point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as
2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”).
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Figure 7: The Effect of Future Event Likelihood1 and Compensation Interdependence2 on
Workplace Deviance Behavior3
30

28

Workplace Deviance

26.02
26

24
22.08
21.83

22

20

20.07

18
Compensation Interdependence Absent Compensation Interdependence Present
Low Likelihood

High Likelihood

1

Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
2
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
3
Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual
items is used to measure workplace deviance.
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Figure 8: Coefficients of Multi-Group Path Analysis1 Examining the Effects of
Compensation Interdependence by Future Event Likelihood

Adjustment
Expectation

Low: -0.289, p=0.001
High: -0.384, p<0.001

Effort

Low: -0.282, p=0.005
High: 0.037, p=0.724
Low: 0.425, p<0.001
High: 0.473, p<0.001

Interdependence
(Absent vs.
Present)

Low: 0.198, p=0.055
High: -0.175, p=0.092
Low: 0.379, p<0.001
High: 0.171, p=0.077

Distributive
Justice

1

Low: -0.183, p<0.062
High: -0.368, p<0.001

Workplace
Deviance

The path model is estimated on two groups of Low Likelihood (N=91) and High Likelihood (N= 91)
simultaneously. This is an unconstrained model, allowing all path coefficients to differ between groups.
Interdependence is coded as 0 for interdependence absent and as 1 for interdependence present. The data fits the
model well: χ²(4) = 3.211 (p = 0.523), RMSEA = 0.000, CFI = 1.000, NFI = 0.979., PCLOSE=0.712. All
significances are two tailed at a 95% confidence level.
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Figure 9: Coefficients of Multi-Group Path Analysis1 Examining the Effects of
Compensation Interdependence by Future Event Likelihood – Raise Condition

Adjustment
Expectation

Low: -0.441, p<0.001
High:-0.332, p<0.001

Effort

Low: -0.128, p=0.211
High: 0.120, p=0.243
Low: -0.136, p=0.224
High: 0.314, p<0.001

Interdependence
(Absent vs.
Present)

Low: -0.023, p=0.824
High: -0.201, p=0.047
Low: 0.445, p<0.001
High: 0.236, p=0.020

Distributive
Justice

1

Low: -0.136, p=0.137
High: -0.105, p=0.299

Workplace
Deviance

The path model is estimated on two groups of Low Likelihood (N= 95) and High Likelihood (N=94)
simultaneously. This is an unconstrained model, allowing all path coefficients to differ between groups.
Interdependence is coded as 0 for interdependence absent and as 1 for interdependence present. The data fits the
model well: χ²(4) = 3.211 (p = 0.523), RMSEA = 0.000, CFI = 1.000, NFI = 0.979., PCLOSE=0.712. All
significances are two tailed at a 95% confidence level.
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Table 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Dependent Variable Scales1
Panel A: Distributive Justice Scale2
Item
1: "To a small extent" and 7: "To a large extent"
My bonus reflects the effort I placed into my work
My bonus is appropriate for the work I have completed
My bonus reflects what I have contributed to the organization
My bonus is justified given my performance
Eigenvalue
% Variance Explained
Cronbach's α

Standardized
Factor Loading
0.73
0.87
0.81
0.83
3.24
81.05%
0.92

Panel B: Adjustment Expectation Scale3
Item
1: "Strongly Agree" and 7: "Strongly Disagree"
I expect my manager to make an adjustment to increase my bonus.
I believe my manager will make an adjustment to increase my bonus.
Eigenvalue
% Variance Explained
Cronbach's α

Standardized
Factor Loading
0.84
0.84
1.68
84.00%
0.81

Panel C: Workplace Deviance Scale4
Item
1 = "Significantly less than 2019" and 5 = "Significantly more than 2019"
Intentionally arrive late to work
Call in sick when I'm not really ill
Take underserved breaks to avoid work
Make unauthorized use of organizational property
Leave work early without permission
Lie about the number of hours I work
Work on personal matters on the job instead of working for my employer
Purposely ignore my supervisor's instructions
Intentionally slow down the pace of my work
% Variance Explained
Cronbach's α
1

Standardized
Factor Loading
0.90
0.8474
0.88
0.90
0.84
0.89
0.85
0.87
0.85
81.60%
0.96

I use the principal component method for my factor analysis. Only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1
was extracted from each scale. The actual eigenvalue for each scale is presented in the table above.
2
Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive
justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001).
3
The adjustment expectation scale is created to determine participant’s expectations about their supervisor’s
willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their bonus to adjust for the unexpected negative event.
Participants provide their answers using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and 7
corresponds to “strongly agree”.
4
Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”).

104

Table 2: Demographic Characteristics by Condition
Low Likelihood1

High Likelihood

Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
2
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
N

TOTAL

44

47

45

46

182

Gender3
Male
Female
Not Disclosed
Total

55%
45%
0%
100%

53%
47%
0%
100%

49%
51%
0%
100%

46%
54%
0%
100%

51%
49%
0%
100%

Age4
18 - 29
30 - 39
40 - 49
50 - 59
60 and older
Total

43%
43%
11%
2%
0%
100%

45%
32%
15%
9%
0%
100%

42%
49%
7%
2%
0%
100%

50%
37%
9%
4%
0%
100%

45%
40%
11%
4%
0%
100%

Education5
High School
Trade
College
University
Masters or Higher
Total

27%
5%
18%
41%
9%
100%

30%
6%
11%
43%
11%
100%

20%
0%
16%
44%
20%
100%

7%
4%
22%
39%
28%
100%

21%
4%
16%
42%
17%
100%

1

Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
2
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
3
Participants respond to the question: “What is your gender?”. Answers include: “Male”, “Female” and “Prefer not
to disclose”.
4
Participants respond to the question: “What age bracket do you fall into?”. Answers include: “18 - 29 years”, “30
– 39 years”, “40 - 49 years”, “50 - 59 years” and “60 years and older”.
5
Participants respond to the question: “What is your education level?”. Answers include: “High School Diploma”,
“Apprenticeship or Trade”, “Post-Secondary Diploma”, “Post-Secondary Degree” and “Master’s Degree or Higher”.
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Low Likelihood

High Likelihood

Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present

TOTAL

Professional Designation6
Yes
No
Total

41%
59%
100%

28%
72%
100%

40%
60%
100%

35%
65%
100%

36%
64%
100%

Employment Status7
Full Time Employee
Part Time Employee
Self Employed
Business Owner
Full Time Student
Unemployed
Total

50%
16%
9%
2%
9%
14%
100%

32%
13%
17%
0%
15%
23%
100%

51%
13%
7%
0%
7%
22%
100%

52%
20%
9%
0%
7%
13%
100%

46%
15%
11%
1%
9%
18%
100%

10
(8)

11
(9)

11
(7)

9
(8)

10
(8)

48%
52%
100%

40%
60%
100%

47%
53%
100%

48%
52%
100%

46%
54%
100%

Full Time Experience8

Receive Bonus9
Yes
No
Total

Participants respond to the question: “Do you have a professional designation?”. Answers include “yes” and “no”.
Participants respond to the question: “What is your current employment status?”. Answers include “Full time
employee (work more than 35 hours a week), “Part time employee (work less than 35 hours a week)”, “Self
employed”, “Business owner”, “Full time student” and “Unemployed”.
8
Participants respond to the question: “How many years of full-time work experience do you have?”. Answers are
typed into a textbox. The reported numbers are means (standard deviations).
9
Participants respond to the question: “Have you ever received a bonus as part of your compensation package?”
Answers include “yes” and “no”.
6
7
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Low Likelihood
High Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
10
Had Performance Evaluation Meeting
Yes
70%
68%
82%
80%
No
30%
32%
18%
20%
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%

TOTAL

75%
25%
100%

Performed Performance Evaluation of Employee11
Yes
27%
28%
No
73%
72%
Total
100%
100%

29%
71%
100%

30%
70%
100%

29%
71%
100%

Negotiated Results of Their Performance Evaluation12
Yes
25%
17%
No
75%
83%
Total
100%
100%

20%
80%
100%

22%
78%
100%

21%
79%
100%

4
(2)

5
(2)

4
(2)

Effects of COVID 1913
4
(2)

4
(2)

Participants respond to the question: “Do you have a meeting with your supervisor to review your performance
evaluation?” Answers include “yes” and “no”.
11
Participants respond to the question: “Have you ever conducted a performance evaluation for your employee?”.
Answers include “yes” and “no”.
12
Participants respond to the question: “Have you ever negotiated the results of your performance evaluation?”.
Answers include “yes” and “no”.
13
Participants respond to the question: “To what extent has your employment income been effected by the COVID
19 pandemic?”. Participants answer on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 representing as “not affected” and 7
representing “very affected”. The reported numbers are means (standard deviations).
10
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Table 3: Cross-Tabulation (χ² Tests) of Randomization of Categorical Demographic
Variables1
Comparisons between
Conditions
χ²
Gender2
Age3
Professional Designation4
Employment Status5
Receive Bonus6
Performance Evaluation Meeting7
Conducted Performance Evaluation of Employee8
Negotiated Results of Their Performance Evaluation9

<0.791
<3.936
<1.701
<5.150
<0.088
<4.189
<0.108
<0.267

df

p-value
1
3
1
5
1
1
1
1

>0.374
>0.268
>0.192
>0.398
>0.766
>0.041
>0.743
>0.605

In the χ² tests presented in this table, the frequency of the demographic variables is compared for each of the two
independent variables, separately.
2
Participants respond to the question: “What is your gender?”. Answers include: “Male”, “Female” and “Prefer not
to disclose”.
3
Participants respond to the question: “What age bracket do you fall into?”. Answers include: “18 - 29 years”, “30 –
39 years”, “40 - 49 years”, “50 - 59 years” and “60 years and older”.
4
Participants respond to the question: “Do you have a professional designation?”. Answers include “yes” and “no”.
5
Participants respond to the question: “What is your current employment status?”. Answers include “Full time
employee (work more than 35 hours a week), “Part time employee (work less than 35 hours a week)”, “Self
employed”, “Business owner”, “Full time student” and “Unemployed”.
6
Participants respond to the question: “Have you ever received a bonus as part of your compensation package?”
Answers include “yes” and “no”.
7
Participants respond to the question: “Do you have a meeting with your supervisor to review your performance
evaluation?” Answers include “yes” and “no”.
8
Participants respond to the question: “Have you ever conducted a performance evaluation for your employee?”.
Answers include “yes” and “no”.
9
Participants respond to the question: “Have you ever negotiated the results of your performance evaluation?”.
Answers include “yes” and “no”.
1
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Table 4: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Testing the Randomization of Full Time
Experience, Education, and the Effects of COVID-19
Panel A: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Full Time Work Experience1
Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1
1
1
178

6.838
0.845
75.324
66.173

0.103
0.013
1.138

Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Likelihood
Compensation Interdependence
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1
1
1
178

17.715
1.142
1.469
1.809

9.795
0.631
0.812

Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Likelihood
Compensation Interdependence
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1
1
1
178

12.147
0.018
10.213
5.349

2.271
0.003
1.909

p-value
(twotailed)
0.748
0.91
0.287

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Education4
p-value
(twotailed)
0.002
0.428
0.369

Panel C: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Effects of COVID-195

Participants response to the question: “How many years of full-time work experience do you have?”. Answers are
typed into a textbox.
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
4
Participants respond to the question: “What is your education level?”. Answers include: “High School Diploma”,
“Apprenticeship or Trade”, “Post-Secondary Diploma”, “Post-Secondary Degree” and “Master’s Degree or Higher”.
5
Participants respond to the question: “To what extent has your employment income been affected by the COVID
19 pandemic?”. Participants answer on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 representing as “not affected” and 7
representing “very affected”.
1
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p-value
(twotailed)
0.134
0.954
0.169

Table 5: Percentage of Participants Correctly Responding to Case Comprehension Quiz
Questions by Condition
Low Likelihood
Interdependence
Absent

High Likelihood

Interdependence
Present

Interdependence
Absent

Interdependence
Present

TOTAL

Q11

98%

96%

98%

96%

97%

2

95%

85%

84%

85%

87%

Q33

100%

94%

98%

98%

97%

Q44

86%

85%

91%

96%

90%

Q5

5

95%

94%

96%

93%

93%

Q6

6

100%

94%

96%

100%

95%

Q7

7

93%

94%

91%

89%

92%

Q8

8

89%

91%

76%

91%

87%

93%

91%

80%

93%

89%

95%

100%

98%

96%

97%

Q2

Q99
Q10

10

Question 1 is a true or false question that asks participants: “The negative event had a negative impact on your
division’s profit (i.e./ reported profit was smaller than it would have been without the unexpected event.”
2
Question 2 is a multiple-choice question that asks participants: “What is the likelihood that events similar to that
which occurred in 2019 will affect Division X (your division) in future years.” The correct answer varied by
condition (extremely low vs. extremely high).
3
Question 3 is a true or false question that asks participants: “The unforeseen event that occurred in 2019 (i.e., the
current period) was outside of your control.”
4
Question 4 is a true or false question that asks participants: “You could with considerable effort – greatly reduce
the negative effects of similar types of events in the future.
5
Question 5 is a true or false question and asks participants: “In 2019, Division Y (your co-worker’s division) did
not experience any negative events.
6
Question 6 is a true or false question and asks participants: “In 2019, Division Y (your co-worker’s division)
earned a higher profit than Division X (your division).
7
Question 7 is a multiple question, the correct answer varies by condition, and asks participants: “Your bonus is
paid to you as a:”. The answers are “Lump sum payment” or “Salary increase that is evenly allocated to your
regular paychecks” or “Do not recall”.
8
Question 8 is a multiple-choice question, the correct answer varies by condition, and asks participants: “Your
bonus comes from:”. The answers are: An individual bonus pool that is solely based on your division’s performance
or A shared bonus pool that is determined based on LDV’s profit and divided between you and the Division Y
manager or “Do not recall”.
9
Question 9 is a true or false question and asks participants: Your bonus amount has a financial impact on the bonus
received by the Division Y manager.
10
Question 10 is a true or false question and asks participants: Your supervisor has the ability to make adjustments
(changes) to your bonus.
1
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Table 6: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Distributive Justice -Testing H1a and H1b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Distributive Justice1

N

Low Likelihood
High Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
44
47
45
46

Mean
SD

9.818
(4.172)

11.468
(4.075)

13.178
(5.047)

11.370
(5.255)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Distributive Justice
Source of Variation
Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

120.896
0.285

5.553
0.013

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.020
0.909

1

135.947

6.244

0.013

178

21.773

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

74.375

2.801

0.098

1

61.862

3.641

0.060

1

251.101

11.688

<0.001

1

0.226

0.010

0.920

Panel C: Simple Effects

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present – H1a
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present – H1b
Interdependence Absent - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood

1

Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive
justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001). The scale sum is used as the
measure of distributive justice.
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
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Table 7: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Adjustment Expectation – Testing H2a and H2b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Adjustment Expectation1

N
Mean
SD

Low Likelihood
High Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
44
47
45
46
8.636
(2.73)

6.936
(3.089)

7.659
(2.957)

7.848
(3.340)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Adjustment Expectation
Source of Variation
Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

0.049
25.822

0.005
2.792

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.942
0.096

1

40.331

4.361

0.038

177

9.248

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

0.801

0.080

0.778

1

65.691

7.703

0.007

1

21.011

2.596

0.111

1

19.321

1.869

0.175

Panel C: Simple Effects

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present – H2a
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present – H2b
Interdependence Absent - Low Vs.
High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low Vs.
High Likelihood

The adjustment expectation scale is created to determine participant’s expectations about their supervisor’s
willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their bonus to adjust for the unexpected negative event.
Participants provide their answers to two items using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly
disagree” and 7 corresponds to “strongly agree”. The scale sum is used as the measure of adjustment expectation.
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
1
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Table 8: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Effort –Testing H3a and H3b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Effort1
Low Likelihood

High Likelihood

Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
N
Mean
SD

44

47

45

46

2.591
(0.844)

2.979
(0.872)

3.044
(1.167)

2.913
(1.244)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Effort
Source of Variation
Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

1.710
0.747

1.560
0.682

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.213
0.410

1

3.065

2.795

0.096

178

1.097

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

0.393

0.270

0.605

1

3.418

4.636

0.034

1

4.576

4.397

0.039

1

0.100

0.087

0.768

Panel C: Simple Effects

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent vs. Present – H3a
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent vs. Present – H3b
Interdependence Absent - Low
Likelihood vs. High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low
Likelihood vs. High Likelihood

Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired
effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate
this dependent variable is “…your supervisor provides you with no bonus adjustment)”. Participants respond using a
5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as
2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”).
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
1
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Table 9: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Workplace Deviance – Testing H4a and H4b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Workplace Deviance1

N

Low Likelihood
High Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
44
47
45
46

Mean
SD

26.205
(7.099)

21.830
(9.097)

20.067
(8.910)

22.804
(8.326)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Workplace Deviance
Source of Variation
Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

303.073
30.467

4.286
0.431

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.040
0.512

1

575.077

8.133

0.005

178

70.707

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

170.488

2.295

0.133

1

434.928

6.480

0.013

1

838.131

12.883

<0.001

1

22.080

0.290

0.591

Panel C: Simple Effects

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent vs. Present - H4a
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent vs. Present – H4b
Interdependence Absent - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood

1

Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual
items is used to measure workplace deviance.
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.

114

Table 10: Multi-Group Path Analysis Results Examining the Effects of Compensation
Interdependence by Future Event Likelihood1

Low Likelihood (N = 91)
Structural Path
Interdependence2 →Adjustment
Expectation3
Interdependence → Distributive Justice4
Adjustment Expectation → Effort5
Adjustment Expectation →Workplace
Deviance6
Distributive Justice → Effort
Distributive Justice →Workplace
Deviance

Standardized
Coefficient

S.E

p value
(two
tailed)

High Likelihood (N = 91)
Standardized
Coefficient

S.E

p value
(two
tailed)

-0.282

0.609

0.005

0.037

0.622

0.724

0.198
-0.289

0.860
0.026

0.055
0.001

-0.175
-0.384

1.074
0.031

0.092
<0.001

0.379

0.273

<0.001

0.171

0.267

0.077

0.425

0.089

<0.001

0.473

0.019

<0.001

-0.183

0.198

0.062

-0.368

0.161

<0.001

1

This is a fully unconstrained model and path coefficients are allowed to differ between groups. The data fits the
model well: χ²(4) = 3.211 (p = 0.523), RMSEA = 0.000, CFI = 1.000, NFI = 0.979, PCLOSE=0.712. All
significances are two tailed at a 95% confidence level.
2
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool. Compensation interdependence absent is coded 0 and compensation interdependence present
is coded 1.
3
Adjustment expectation is based on a scale I created to determine participant’s expectations about their supervisor’s
willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their bonus to adjust for the unexpected negative event.
Participants provide their answers using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and 7
corresponds to “strongly agree”.
4
Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive
justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001). The scale sum is used as the
measure of distributive justice.
Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired
effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate
this dependent variable is “…your supervisor provides you with no bonus adjustment”. Participants respond using a
5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as
2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”).
6
Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual
items is used to measure workplace deviance.
5
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Table 11: Participant Demographic Variables as Covariates Analyzing the Effects of
Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence
Panel A: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Distributive Justice1
Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Education2
Performance Evaluation Meeting3
Likelihood4
Compensation Interdependence5
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1
1
1
1
1
176

7.240
4.291
0.286
28.066
38.381
9.298

0.779
0.462
0.031
3.018
4.128

Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Education
Performance Evaluation Meeting
Likelihood
Compensation Interdependence
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1 73.188
1 20.346
1 142.936
1
0.024
1 123.555
176 21.562

3.394
0.944
6.629
0.001
5.730

p-value
(twotailed)
0.379
0.498
0.861
0.084
0.044

Panel B: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Adjustment Expectations6

1

p-value
(twotailed)
0.067
0.333
0.011
0.973
0.018

Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive
justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001). The scale sum is used as a
measure of distributive justice.
2
Participants respond to the question: “What is your education level?”. Answers include: “High School Diploma”,
“Apprenticeship or Trade”, “Post-Secondary Diploma”, “Post-Secondary Degree” and “Master’s Degree or Higher”.
3
Participants respond to the question: “Do you have a meeting with your supervisor to review your performance
evaluation?” Answers include “yes” and “no”.
4
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
5
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
6
Adjustment expectation is a measure based on a scale I created to determine participant’s expectations about their
supervisor’s willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their raise to adjust for the unexpected negative
event. Participants provide their answers to two items using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly
disagree” and 7 corresponds to “strongly agree”. The scale sum is used as a measure of adjustment expectation.
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Panel C: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Effort7
DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

Education8
Performance Evaluation Meeting9
Likelihood10
Compensation Interdependence11

1
1
1
1

0.983
0.762
1.863
0.912

0.893
0.692
1.693
0.828

0.346
0.407
0.195
0.364

Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence

1

2.864

2.602

0.109

176

1.101

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

Education
Performance Evaluation Meeting
Likelihood
Compensation Interdependence

1
1
1
1

230.012
0.059
417.208
41.160

3.280
0.001
5.949
0.587

0.072
0.977
0.016
0.445

Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence

1

523.307

7.462

0.007

176

70.131

Source of Variation

Error
Panel D: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Workplace Deviance12
Source of Variation

Error

Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired
effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate
this dependent variable is “…your supervisor provides you with no bonus adjustment”. Participants respond using a
5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as
2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”).
8
Participants respond to the question: “What is your education level?”. Answers include: “High School Diploma”,
“Apprenticeship or Trade”, “Post-Secondary Diploma”, “Post-Secondary Degree” and “Master’s Degree or Higher”.
9
Participants respond to the question: “Do you have a meeting with your supervisor to review your performance
evaluation?” Answers include “yes” and “no”.
10
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
11
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
12
Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual
items is used to measure workplace deviance.
7
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Table 12: Participants’ Psychological Traits as Covariates Analyzing the Effects of Future Event
Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence
Panel A: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Distributive Justice1
Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Enjoyment of Competition2
Conscientiousness3
Equity Sensitivity4
Likelihood5
Compensation Interdependence6
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1 44.935
1 22.064
1 16.648
1 125.006
1
3.281
1 162.617
171 22.089

2.034
0.999
0.754
5.659
0.149
7.362

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.156
0.319
0.387
0.018
0.700
0.007

Panel B: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Adjustment Expectation7
Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Competitive
Conscientiousness
Equity Sensitivity
Likelihood
Compensation Interdependence
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1
1
1
1
1
1
171

3.152
2.026
0.019
0.001
25.409
37.311
9.524

0.331
0.213
0.002
0.000
2.668
3.917

1

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.566
0.645
0.964
0.994
0.104
0.049

Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive justice scale originally
created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001). The scale sum is used as a measure of distributive justice.
2
Enjoyment of competition is one of the two constructs measured in the Competitiveness Scale adapted from the Smither and Houston
(1992) Competitiveness Index. Based on Houston, Harris, McIntire, and Francis’ analysis, this index is divided into two main factors
(enjoyment of competition and conscientiousness). I utilize the sum of the items identified as enjoyment of competition to measure
enjoyment of competition.
3
Conscientiousness is one of the two constructs measured in the Competitiveness Scale adapted from the Smither and Houston (1992)
Competitiveness Index. Based on Houston, Harris, McIntire, and Francis’ analysis, this index is divided into two main factors
(enjoyment of competition and conscientiousness). I utilize the sum of the items identified as conscientiousness to measure
conscientiousness.
4
Equity sensitivity is adapted from King and Miles (1994) Equity Sensitivity Scale. This scale consists of 5 questions in which
participants need to allocate 10 points between themselves and the organization they work for.
5
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the likelihood of the negative
event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
6
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs. compensation
interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual pool or a shared pool.
7
Adjustment expectation is a measure based on a scale I created to determine participant’s expectations about their supervisor’s
willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their raise to adjust for the unexpected negative event. Participants provide their
answers to two items using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and 7 corresponds to “strongly agree”.
The scale sum is used as a measure of adjustment expectation.
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Panel C: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Effort8
Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Enjoyment of Competition9
Conscientiousness10
Equity Sensitivity11
Likelihood12
Compensation Interdependence13
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1
1
1
1
1
1
171

0.183
0.018
1.662
1.855
0.430
3.381
1.112

0.164
0.016
1.495
1.669
0.387
3.042

Source of Variation

DF

MS

F

Enjoyment of Competition
Conscientiousness
Equity Sensitivity
Likelihood
Compensation Interdependence
Likelihood * Compensation Interdependence
Error

1
1
1
1
1
1
171

2.491
73.036
921.687
358.337
1.361
448.694
65.789

0.038
1.110
14.010
5.447
0.021
6.820

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.686
0.899
0.223
0.198
0.535
0.083

Panel B: Results of ANCOVA
Dependent Variable: Workplace Deviance14

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.846
0.294
0.000
0.021
0.886
0.010

Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired effort level for the
year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate this dependent variable is “…your
supervisor provides you with no bonus adjustment”. Participants respond using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to
“significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than
2019”).
9
Enjoyment of competition is one of the two constructs measured in the Competitiveness Scale adapted from the Smither and Houston
(1992) Competitiveness Index. Based on Houston, Harris, McIntire, and Francis’ analysis, this index is divided into two main factors
(enjoyment of competition and conscientiousness). I utilize the sum of the items identified as enjoyment of competition to measure
enjoyment of competition.
10
Conscientiousness is one of the two constructs measured in the Competitiveness Scale adapted from the Smither and Houston
(1992) Competitiveness Index. Based on Houston, Harris, McIntire, and Francis’ analysis, this index is divided into two main factors
(enjoyment of competition and conscientiousness). I utilize the sum of the items identified as conscientiousness to measure
conscientiousness.
11
Equity sensitivity is adapted from King and Miles (1994) Equity Sensitivity Scale. This scale consists of 5 questions in which
participants need to allocate 10 points between themselves and the organization they work for.
12
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the likelihood of the
negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
13
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs. compensation
interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual pool or a shared pool.
14
Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The 9-item scale asks
participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants provide their answers using a 5-point
Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to
“significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual items is used to measure workplace deviance.
8
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Table 13: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Distributive Justice – Raise Supplemental Study (Testing Boundary Condition for H1a and
H1b)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Distributive Justice1

N

Low Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
50
45

Mean
SD

12.380
(5.075)

12.156
(4.805)

High Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
42
52
13.000
(4.675)

11.077
(4.719)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Distributive Justice
Source of Variation
Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

2.467
54.090

0.106
2.322

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.745
0.129

1

33.841

1.453

0.230

185

23.294

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

85.925

3.891

0.052

1

1.193

0.049

0.826

1

8.774

0.366

0.547

1

28.067

1.239

0.268

Panel C: Simple Effects

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Interdependence Absent - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood

1

Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive
justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001). The scale sum is used as a
measure of distributive justice.
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
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Table 14: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Adjustment Expectations – Raise Supplemental Study (Testing Boundary Condition for
H2a and H2b)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Adjustment Expectation4
Low Likelihood
High Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
N
50
45
42
52
Mean
SD

8.400
(3.010)

7.622
(3.077)

7.024
(2.917)

7.750
(3.086)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Adjustment Expectation
Source of Variation
Likelihood5
Compensation Interdependence6
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

18.279
0.031

1.995
0.003

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.160
0.954

1

26.529

2.895

0.091

185

9.164

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

12.253

1.350

0.248

1

14.327

1.548

0.217

1

43.230

4.906

0.029

1

0.394

0.041

0.839

Panel C: Simple Effects

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Interdependence Absent - Low Vs.
High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low Vs.
High Likelihood

Adjustment expectation is a measure based on a scale I created to determine participant’s expectations about their
supervisor’s willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their raise to adjust for the unexpected negative
event. Participants provide their answers to two items using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly
disagree” and 7 corresponds to “strongly agree”. The scale sum is used as a measure of adjustment expectation.
5
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
6
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their bonus comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
4
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Table 15: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Effort – Raise Supplemental Study (Testing Boundary Condition for H3a and H3b)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Effort1
Low Likelihood

High Likelihood

Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
N
Mean
SD

50

45

42

52

2.880
(1.023)

3.267
(1.214)

3.000
(0.988)

2.692
(1.130)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Effort
Source of Variation
Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

2.421
0.073

2.025
0.061

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.156
0.805

1

5.655

4.730

0.031

185

1.195

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

2.200

1.926

0.169

1

3.541

2.837

0.095

1

0.329

0.324

0.571

1

7.958

5.821

0.018

Panel C: Simple Effects - Test of
H1 and H2

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Interdependence Absent - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood

Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired
effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate
this dependent variable is “…your supervisor provides you with no raise adjustment)”. Participants respond using a
5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as
2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”).
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their raise comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
1
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Table 16: The Effects of Future Event Likelihood and Compensation Interdependence on
Workplace Deviance – Raise Supplemental Study (Testing Boundary Condition for H4a
and H4b)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Workplace Deviance1

N

Low Likelihood
High Likelihood
Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
50
45
42
52

Mean
SD

21.120
(8.731)

20.267
(8.398)

21.381
(9.120)

22.269
(9.45)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA
Dependent Variable: Workplace Deviance
Source of Variation
Likelihood2
Compensation Interdependence3
Likelihood * Compensation
Interdependence
Error

DF

MS

F

1
1

60.091
0.014

0.751
0.000

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.387
0.989

1

35.575

0.445

0.506

185

80.012

DF

MS

F

p-value
(two-tailed)

1

18.333

0.212

0.646

1

17.246

0.235

0.629

1

1.554

0.020

0.889

1

96.742

1.200

0.276

Panel C: Simple Effects

High Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Low Likelihood - Interdependence
Absent Vs. Present
Interdependence Absent - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood
Interdependence Present - Low
Likelihood Vs. High Likelihood

1

Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual
items is used to measure workplace deviance.
2
Likelihood represents the manipulation of future event likelihood. Participants are either informed that the
likelihood of the negative event reoccurring is extremely low vs. extremely high.
3
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their raise comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool.
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Table 17: Path Analysis Examining the Interactive Effects of Future Event Likelihood and
Interdependence on Distributive Justice, and Adjustment Expectations – Raise
Supplemental Study1

Low Likelihood (N= 94)
Structural Path
Interdependence2 →Adjustment
Expectation3
Interdependence → Distributive Justice4
Adjustment Expectation → Effort5
Adjustment Expectation →Workplace
Deviance6
Distributive Justice → Effort
Distributive Justice →Workplace
Deviance

Standardized
Coefficient

S.E

p value
(two
tailed)

High Likelihood (N =95)
Standardized
Coefficient

S.E

p value
(two
tailed)

-0.128

0.622

0.211

0.120

0.622

0.243

0.023
-0.289

1.012
0.034

0.824
<0.001

-0.201
-0.332

0.970
0.033

0.047
<0.001

0.379

0.256

<0.001

0.236

0.311

0.020

0.425

0.021

0.224

0.314

0.021

<0.001

-0.183

0.259

0.137

-0.105

0.197

0.299

This is a fully unconstrained model. The data fits the model well: χ²(4) = 2.321 (p = 0.677), RMSEA = 0.000, CFI
= 1.000, NFI = 0.981., PCLOSE=0.826. All significances are two tailed at a 95% confidence level.
2
Compensation interdependence is manipulated at two levels (compensation interdependence absent vs.
compensation interdependence present). Participants are either informed that their raise comes from an individual
pool or a shared pool. Compensation interdependence absent is coded 0 and compensation interdependence present
is coded 1.
3
Adjustment expectation is a measure based on a scale I created to determine participant’s expectations about their
supervisor’s willingness to make a discretionary adjustment to their raise to adjust for the unexpected negative
event. Participants provide their answers to two items using a 7-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “strongly
disagree” and 7 corresponds to “strongly agree”. The scale sum is used as a measure of adjustment expectation.
4
Distributive justice is measured based on the scale used by Kelly et al. (2015), who use an adapted distributive
justice scale originally created by Leventhal (1980) and validated by Colquitt (2001). The scale sum is used as a
measure of distributive justice.
5
Effort is measured based on participants answer to the following question: “For each scenario, state your desired
effort level for the year 2020, in reaction to your supervisor’s adjustment decision.” The scenario used to calculate
this dependent variable is “…your supervisor provides you with no raise adjustment)”. Participants respond using a
5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less effort than 2019”, 3 corresponds to “same effort as
2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more effort than 2019”).
6
Workplace deviance is measured using a modified version of the Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield (1999) scale. The
9-item scale asks participants to provide their intention to engage in various negative behaviors. Participants
provide their answers using a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 corresponds to “significantly less than 2019”, 3
corresponds to “same as 2019” and 5 corresponds to “significantly more than 2019”). The sum of the individual
items is used to measure workplace deviance.
1
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APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT
Screen 1: Potential Bonus Incentives Screen [All Conditions]

125

Screen 2: Experiment Instructions [All Conditions]

126

Screen 3: Company Background [All Conditions]

127

Screen 4: Incentive Type Manipulations [All Conditions]

128

Screen 5: Compensation Interdependence Manipulation
Screen 5: Compensation Interdependence Absent, Bonus Condition

129

Screen 5: Compensation Interdependence Present, Bonus Condition

130

Screen 6: Future Event Likelihood Manipulation
Screen 6: Future Event Likelihood High

131

Screen 6: Future Event Likelihood Low

132

Screen 7: Financial Impact of Negative Events
Screen 7: Financial Impact of Negative Events – [Compensation Interdependence Absent]

133

Screen 7: Financial Impact of Negative Events – [Compensation Interdependence Present]

134

Screen 8: Case Comprehension Quiz [All Conditions]

135

Screen 9: Impact of Unforeseen Event Question [All Conditions]

136

Screen 10: Event Likelihood Manipulation Question [All Conditions]

137

Screen 11: Control Question [All Conditions]

138

Screen 12: Ability to Reduce Future Events with Considerable Effort [All Conditions]

139

Screen 13: Events in Division Y [All Conditions]

140

Screen 14: Division Y Profit Compared to Division X [All Conditions]

141

Screen 15: Compensation Payment
Screen 15: Compensation Payment [All Conditions]

142

Screen 16: Compensation Interdependence Manipulation [All Conditions]

143

Screen 17: Compensation Interdependence Manipulation [All Conditions]

144

Screen 18: Supervisor’s Ability to Make Adjustments [All Conditions]

145

Screen 19: End of Comprehension Quiz [All Conditions]

146

Screen 20: Compensation Expectations [All Conditions]

147

Screen 21: Adjustment Expectations – Likert Scale
Screen 21: Adjustment Expectations – Likert Scale, Compensation Interdependence Present,
Low Likelihood Condition]

148

Screen 21: Adjustment Expectations – Likert Scale, Bonus Compensation Interdependence
Absent, High Likelihood Condition]

149

Screen 22: 2019 Incentive Award [All Conditions]

150

Screen 23: Performance Evaluation – Long Answer [All Conditions]

151

Screen 24: Ask Supervisor for Adjustment
Screen 24: Ask Supervisor for Adjustment – Bonus, Compensation Interdependence Absent,
Low Likelihood Condition

152

Screen 25: Adjustment Requestion [Raise Conditions]
*This screen is only shown if participants click yes for Screen 24

153

Screen 26: Open Ended Question [Raise Conditions]
*This screen is only shown if participants click yes for Screen 24

154

Screen 27: Effort Level Based on Supervisor’s Behavior [All Conditions]
*This screen is only shown if participants click yes for Screen 24

155

Screen 28: Reminder to Participants That They Decided Not to Ask for an Adjustment [All
Conditions]
*This screen is only shown if participants click no for Screen 24 and becomes Screen 25

156

Screen 29: Distributive Justice Scale [All Conditions]

157

Screen 30: Compensation Satisfaction Scale [All Conditions]

158

Screen 31 – Average Employees Adjustment Expectations [All Conditions]

159

Screen 32: Average Employee Adjustment Expectations
Screen 32: Average Employee Adjustment Expectations –Compensation Interdependence
Absent, High Likelihood

160

Screen 33: Effort Scale Based on Various Adjustment Scenarios [All Conditions]

161

Screen 34: Workplace Deviance Scale [All Conditions]

162

Screen 35: Compensation Importance Scale [All Conditions]

163

Screen 36: Attention Check Incentive Questions [All Conditions]

164

Screen 37: Attention Check Question 1 [All Conditions]

165

Screen 38: Attention Check Question 2 [All Conditions]

166

Screen 40: Demographic Question Screen [All Conditions]

167

Screen 41: The Effects of COVID 19 [All Conditions]

168

Screen 42: Gender Question [All Conditions]

169

Screen 43: Age Questions [All Conditions]

170

Screen 44: Education Level Question [All Conditions]

171

Screen 45: Professional Designation Question [All Conditions]

172

Screen 46: Type of Professional Designations [All Conditions]
*This screen is only displayed if participants answer yes to Screen 45

173

Screen 47: Years of Work Experience [All Conditions]

174

Screen 48: Employment Status [All Conditions]

175

Screen 49: Bonus as Part of Compensation Package [All Conditions]

176

Screen 50: Performance Evaluation Meeting [All Conditions]

177

Screen 51: Description of Performance Evaluation Meeting [All Conditions]
*This screen is only shown to participants who answer yes to Screen 50

178

Screen 52: Conducted Performance Evaluation [All Conditions]

179

Screen 53: Negotiation of Performance Evaluation Results [All Conditions]

180

Screen 54: Equity Sensitivity Scale [All Conditions]

181

Screen 55: Equity Sensitivity Scale [All Conditions]

182

Screen 56: Equity Sensitivity Scale [All Conditions]

183

Screen 57: Equity Sensitivity Scale [All Conditions]

184

Screen 58: Equity Sensitivity Scale [All Conditions]

185

Screen 59: Competitiveness Scale [All Conditions]

186

Screen 60: Final Thank You Screen [All Conditions]

187

APPENDIX 2: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND OTHER
MEASURED VARIABLES
Independent Variable Manipulation – Compensation Interdependence Manipulation 1
Compensation Interdependence Absent

Compensation Interdependence Present

188

Independent Variable Manipulation – Compensation Interdependence Manipulation 2
Compensation Interdependence Absent

189

Compensation Interdependence Present

190

Independent Variable Manipulation – Future Event Likelihood Manipulation 1
Future Event Likelihood High

Future Event Likelihood Low

191

Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable – Distributive Justice

192

Dependent Variable - Adjustment Expectations

*Participants in different conditions of the experiment view different versions of this page as
compensation interdependence, and future event likelihood are mentioned.

193

Dependent Variable – Effort

*The precise language varies based on the condition that participants are in (compensation
interdependence present vs. absent) but in all the condition participants are asked to state their
effort next year based on the four scenarios presented.

194

Dependent Variable – Workplace Deviance Scale

195

Other Measured Variables
Incentive Compensation Satisfaction Scale

196

Equity Sensitivity Scale

197

198

199

Competitiveness Scale

200
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